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Abstract 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis I argue against the use of genetic technologies to enhance human 
cognitive capacities.  More specifically, I respond to Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord’s 
“Reversal Test”, which they use to argue in favour of genetic cognitive enhancement.  
The Reversal Test is a burden of proof challenge designed to diagnose status quo bias 
in arguments against enhancement.  By noting that most of those who oppose raising 
intelligence would also oppose lowering intelligence, the Reversal Test puts the onus 
on opponents of enhancement to explain why both increases and decreases in our 
cognitive capacity would be worse than the status quo (our current level of 
intelligence).  Bostrom and Ord claim that if no good reasons can be provided, this 
indicates that the opposition to enhancement is influenced by status quo bias.  Since 
cognitive biases cannot provide a moral reason against enhancement, opposition to 
genetic cognitive enhancement shown to be affected by status quo bias can 
accordingly be discounted.   
 
The aim of my thesis, then, is to overcome the Reversal Test’s burden of proof 
challenge by showing that my reasons for opposing cognitive enhancement are not 
influenced by status quo bias.  However, I do not argue that enhanced intelligence 
could not be beneficial to the individual.  Instead, I claim that the probable unequal 
distribution of enhancements between the best- and worst-off would be likely to cause 
serious injustices to those who are unable to afford them. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 
THE POTENTIAL OF GENETIC ENHANCEMENT 
The Hollywood movie Gattaca depicts a society where pre-implantation genetic 
diagnosis (PGD) is used to ensure children have the best of their parents’ genes.  
Because the technology is afforded only by the middle and upper classes, huge social 
divisions based on genetic profiling have resulted.  Those born without the aid of such 
reproductive technologies face serious discrimination and are relegated to performing 
only menial activities.  However, the use of PGD has also ensured that among those 
born with its use, serious disease has been effectively eradicated. 
 
PGD is not actually the most effective way of ensuring the “best” genes.  PGD 
enables us only to choose the best out of a selection of embryos; with genetic 
engineering it may become possible not only to select between different embryos, but 
to enhance embryos (i.e. future people) with specific genetic traits.  We may also be 
able to use genetic technologies to engineer children and adults (i.e. existing people).  
While this is a situation often depicted in science fiction, it now seems more than just 
a theoretical possibility.  What if, in the future, we could use genetic technologies not 
just to treat but to enhance both existing and future people’s physical and mental 
abilities?  What if we could make people faster, stronger and smarter?  Ought we to 
use these technologies? 
 
The society depicted by Gattaca provides a salient example of the potential of genetic 
enhancement for both good and bad.  Because the consequences of using 
enhancement technologies may be hugely significant to society as well as to the 
individual and, furthermore, because the possible outcomes are at this stage uncertain, 
  7 
it is important to morally evaluate the potential issues surrounding the use of genetic 
enhancement technologies before they become a reality. 
 
The moral question of whether we should permit the use of genetic enhancement 
technologies is a very broad one.  And, I think it highly unlikely that any one 
argument will suffice for determining the moral permissibility or impermissibility of 
using genetic enhancements generally.  A discrete type of enhancement may have its 
own unique consequences and we may therefore have different moral considerations 
to take into account in each case.  Accordingly, we should not expect an argument for 
or against a particular type of enhancement to necessarily apply to all other proposed 
enhancements, and we should not be surprised if it turns out that some sorts of 
enhancements are morally permissible while other types of enhancements are not.  For 
example, an argument in favour of enhancing human strength may not necessarily 
entail that we should also enhance our height.  Because of this constraint, we should 
morally evaluate each proposed type of genetic enhancement in its own right. 
 
In this thesis I will only focus on one specific candidate for enhancement.  I will 
examine whether the use of genetic technologies to enhance human intelligence is 
morally permissible.  Ultimately, I will argue that it is not.  My arguments are 
specifically intended to respond to Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord’s “Reversal Test”, 
which they use to argue in favour of genetic cognitive enhancement.1  The Reversal 
Test is a heuristic for showing that opposition to enhancement is influenced by the 
status quo bias.  By noting that those who oppose raising human intelligence would 
also oppose lowering human intelligence, the Reversal Test puts the onus on 
opponents of enhancement to explain why maintaining the status quo (our current 
intelligence levels) is the best option.  Bostrom and Ord contend that if no sound 
justification can be provided, the opposition to enhancement suffers from status quo 
bias, and is therefore not morally compelling.  However, before outlining exactly how 
I intend to respond to the Reversal Test in this thesis, I will briefly discuss some 
important background information. 
 
                                                 
1
 Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord, "The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics," 
Ethics 116:4 (2006). 
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General Intelligence 
For the purposes of this thesis, the term “intelligence” will be used interchangeably 
with “cognitive capacities”.  Although I do not think it necessary to commit to a 
precise definition of intelligence, the way I will use the term is to refer to general 
intelligence (the attribute the IQ test purports to reflect), as well as such traits as 
numeracy, reasoning, problem solving and the capacity for learning languages.2  
However, the notion of intelligence that I am interested in examining in terms of its 
enhancement does not capture traits like musical talent or artistic ability, or other 
cognitive functions such as empathy and other emotions. 
 
Fallacy of Genetic Determinism 
By talking in such a way about the genetic enhancement of particular phenotypic 
traits, like intelligence, it may seem as though I am assuming a deterministic view 
about genetics.  However, genetic determinism – the belief that one’s genes wholly 
determine one’s phenotype – is false.  Both genes and the environment interact to 
determine one’s intelligence.  Ainsley Newson and Robert Williamson explain: 
 
The current model for intelligence proposes that within a particular population there 
will be many intelligence genes, and a significant environmental impact.  Different 
‘versions’ of these intelligence genes (termed alleles) will contribute either to raising 
or lowering the intelligence levels of individuals within that population.3 
 
Adverse environments may cause adverse phenotypic differences.  A malnourished 
child, for example, may be less intelligent than they would have been had they had 
better nutrition.  Genes, however, are still important.  Some mentally disabled people 
will have adverse genetic mutations so severe that no environment among those they 
are likely to encounter will be able to ensure a normal intelligence.  Likewise, the 
                                                 
2
 While the notion of general intelligence may be controversial, it does seem as though the IQ test 
reflects some sort of variation in cognitive ability (even if it is not "general intelligence").  I have also 
proposed other potentially less controversial traits (like mathematical ability) that the term 
"intelligence" is meant to capture. 
3
 Ainsley Newson and Robert Williamson, "Should We Undertake Genetic Research on Intelligence?," 
Bioethics 13:3/4 (1999), p.329. 
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different genotypes of chimpanzees and humans significantly contribute to their 
different intelligence levels. 
 
Nothing in this thesis assumes the truth of genetic determinism.  We do not need to 
deny that the environment plays an important role in determining one’s phenotype to 
postulate that we may be able to enhance our intelligence through genetic engineering.  
When I talk about genetically enhancing intelligence, I am simply assuming that we 
can alter existing genes or introduce better genes that significantly influence 
intelligence in human beings. 
 
Somatic and Germline Engineering 
There are two foreseeable ways in which we may in the future be able to genetically 
enhance our intelligence.  The first of these genotypic modifications is germline 
enhancement.  Theoretically, germline enhancement is where genetic modifications 
are made to sperm, eggs, or very early embryos.  As a practical matter, however, 
germline engineering would most likely be performed on an egg or early embryo (at 
either the zygote or blastomere stage), since their relatively large size makes them 
much easier to modify than a sperm.  Since the foetus develops through cell division 
and differentiation, all genetic information present in the original cell is replicated in 
each new cell as the foetus grows.  Any genetic modification of the ovum, zygote or 
blastomere4 will therefore be replicated in every other cell of the future person, 
including their reproductive cells, meaning that germline enhancements are heritable.   
 
One potential use for germline engineering is to prevent heritable genetic diseases like 
X-linked recessive disorders from being passed on.  For example, a female zygote that 
is a carrier for Haemophilia A may be genetically engineered to remove the disorder, 
therefore preventing carrier status in that particular individual and potential carrier 
status in her daughters, as well as preventing her sons from expressing the condition.  
In another case, an individual genetically enhanced for higher intelligence would be 
                                                 
4
 In the blastomere case each cell will have to be genetically modified, since at this stage the embryo is 
composed of multiple cells. 
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able to pass the genes for high intelligence down to their offspring, since the changes 
to the genome are passed down through the enhanced reproductive cells.   
 
The second type of genetic engineering is somatic engineering.  Somatic cells can 
basically be seen as body cells (not including the reproductive cells).  Somatic cell 
enhancement involves the addition of “good” genes to specific cells in an individual 
but not an alteration of the germline.  Modifications made through somatic 
enhancement are therefore not able to be passed down to the enhanced individual’s 
offspring. 
 
Somatic engineering could potentially be used to treat or cure people with diseases 
caused by genetic mutations by inserting functioning versions of the genes into 
targeted cells.  Possible candidates for somatic engineering are patients with cystic 
fibrosis, where enhancements may be made to lung cells in order to prevent them 
from producing mucus.  Another use could be for better versions of genes to be added 
to a “normal” human being (i.e. one with no disease) in order to improve their 
capacities in a particular respect.  With cognitive enhancement it is foreseeable for 
genes that contribute to higher intelligence to be inserted into the brain cells of a 
person of average intelligence in order to raise their IQ.  
 
CHAPTERS OUTLINE 
As indicated earlier, in this thesis I argue against the use of these genetic technologies 
to enhance our cognitive capacities.  This is not because there is anything intrinsically 
wrong with genetic engineering, nor because the consequences to the enhanced will 
be necessarily bad.  Rather, my concern is that the probable distribution of 
enhancement technologies will cause serious harm to those who do not have access to 
them.  I argue that it is therefore morally impermissible to permit wealth-based access 
to (i.e. the private purchase of) genetic cognitive enhancements  
 
I noted at the very beginning of this chapter that the specific focus of my thesis is to 
argue against the “Reversal Test”, which I will outline in chapter 2.  As previously 
described, the Reversal Test is a burden of proof challenge posed by Nick Bostrom 
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and Toby Ord that they devise as a heuristic for diagnosing status quo bias in 
arguments against cognitive enhancement. 
 
The Reversal Test simply asks opponents of genetic cognitive enhancement whether it 
would be good, overall, if our cognitive capacities were reduced.  If the answer is 
‘no’, then the opponent of enhancement must provide good reasons for believing that 
both increases and decreases to human intelligence levels would be worse than the 
status quo (our current level of intelligence).  If no good reason can be offered, 
Bostrom and Ord argue, this shows that the original opposition to genetic 
enhancement is influenced by status quo bias.  Since cognitive biases cannot provide a 
moral reason against permitting the genetic enhancement of intelligence, Bostrom and 
Ord contend that opposition to enhancement is therefore flawed.  They assert that 
removal of the bias lends weight to the view that we should permit genetic cognitive 
enhancement.   
 
The main goal of my thesis is to provide a sound response to Bostrom and Ord’s 
application of the Reversal Test to intellectual enhancement.  I aim to show that there 
are in fact compelling reasons (not influenced by status quo bias) for opposing 
cognitive enhancement.  If, by the end of the thesis I have passed the Reversal Test by 
providing good reasons to believe that we should not permit the genetic enhancement 
of intelligence, then I will consider my goal to have been achieved. 
 
I critically respond to the Reversal Test in chapter 3 by advancing a version of what 
can be called the “argument from inequality”.  More specifically, I contend that the 
probable distribution of genetic enhancements would be likely to result in serious 
injustices to the poor.  I motivate this position first with an argument for the 
expectation that genetic enhancements would be unequally distributed between the 
rich and the poor, and secondly with the moral intuition that a policy that benefits 
already well-off sections of society but risks serious harms to those who are the worst-
off is prima facie unjust.  I call this the ‘no harm principle’.  If wealth-based access to 
enhancement technologies results in harm to the poor, then we have prima facie 
reason to consider them unjust. 
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I illustrate how unequal access to enhancement is likely to harm the poor through 
moral and political marginalisation.  I then show that since intelligence has significant 
positional value, its unequal distribution is also likely to competitively harm those 
who are not enhanced (i.e. the poor).  This makes enhancements morally different 
from other unequally distributed goods that do not have these harmful effects. 
 
I also devise a method for balancing the potential benefits of enhancements with the 
potential harms.  Using this method, I am able to show that the benefits to the poor of 
living in a society where the rich members are cognitively enhanced would not be 
likely to compensate for the likely harms of living in that society.  Since permitting 
wealth-based access to genetic enhancement would harm the worst-off and so violate 
the no harm principle, I contend that enhancements are unjust and therefore should 
not be permitted. 
 
I also critically respond to a revised version of the Reversal Test, which Bostrom and 
Ord devise to counter such arguments from inequality and I address some other 
potential arguments that could be made on behalf of the proponent of enhancement.  I 
show why these concerns are not morally compelling. 
 
By the end of chapter 3 I hope to have successfully responded to the initial burden of 
proof set by the Reversal Test by illustrating how wealth-based access to 
enhancements would cause harm to the poor.  However, my argument may still be 
potentially objected to on other grounds.  In chapter 4 I rebut what I take to be the 
strongest objections to the argument from inequality.  These are consistency 
arguments, and there are two important ones to consider.   
 
The first consistency argument, the “argument from medical treatments”, attempts to 
show that the argument from inequality entails the implausible conclusion that we 
should ban non-universal medical treatments for everyone if they are not available for 
all.  I respond to this objection in two ways.  First, by illustrating that the non-
universal use of medical treatments is not as likely to violate the no harm principle as 
the non-universal use of enhancements.  Second, by arguing that while we have a 
prima facie moral obligation not to risk harm to the poor in the distribution of 
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important goods, there are competing moral considerations in the case of medical 
treatments that override the no harm principle in this case. 
 
The second consistency argument I discuss is the “argument from education”.  This 
argument acts similarly to the argument from medical treatments by (rightly) stating 
that we must be consistent in our attitudes toward education (and other environmental 
methods of cognitive enhancement) and genetic cognitive enhancement.  It then 
claims that since education, like genetic cognitive enhancement, is unequally 
distributed between the rich and the poor, then my arguments must, by consistency, 
lead to the conclusion that education should be banned.  Since this is obviously an 
absurd conclusion, it is claimed that my arguments against cognitive enhancement 
must be unsound. 
 
In response, I submit that proponents of the argument from education have failed to 
take into account that education and genetic cognitive enhancement are different in 
morally relevant ways.  These moral differences between the two make it the case that 
it is not inconsistent to think that we should permit education yet prohibit cognitive 
enhancement. 
 
I stated earlier that my main aim in this thesis is to rebut the Reversal Test, which I 
will argue against in chapters 3 and 4.  However, in chapter 5 I present and respond to 
a further burden of proof argument – the “Double Reversal Test” – which Bostrom 
and Ord introduce at the end of their paper.  I argue that the Double Reversal Test also 
fails to show that the argument from inequality is influenced by the status quo bias 
and fails to provide good evidence for thinking that it would be better, all-things-
considered, to enhance our cognitive capacities.  This is because the Double Reversal 
Test introduces competing moral considerations that are not present in the normal 
situation.  Once these relevant differences are recognised and removed, it is easy to 
see how the Double Reversal Test is ineffective in countering my versions of the 
argument from inequality. 
 
By the end of the thesis I intend my rebuttal of both the Reversal Test and the Double 
Reversal Test to have met the burden of proof that Bostrom and Ord set by offering a 
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convincing argument against cognitive enhancement that is not influenced by status 
quo bias.  If these objectives are met, the goal of this thesis will have been achieved. 
 
I begin in chapter 2 by illustrating the Reversal Test and explaining the requirements 
for an argument to meet its burden of proof. 
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CHAPTER 2 
The Reversal Test 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the paper “The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics”, 
Nick Bostrom and Toby Ord argue in favour of using genetic technologies to enhance 
the cognitive capacities of existing and future people.5  They take a reasonably broad 
notion of the term “cognitive capacities”, referring not only to general intelligence but 
also to such abilities as social intelligence and musical talent.  As discussed in the 
introductory chapter, I take a slightly narrower definition of the term “cognitive 
capacities” (not including musical ability, for example).  However, it does not matter 
that Bostrom and Ord take a wider scope – their arguments can be applied just as 
easily to the narrower definition of cognitive capacities (i.e. general intelligence) I am 
interested in examining. 
 
Bostrom and Ord point out that intelligence can plausibly be considered an attribute 
that has not only relative or positional value (i.e. determined by whether and to what 
extent others also have that attribute) but also absolute or intrinsic value (i.e. an 
attribute is valuable in itself).  To illustrate: some traits, such as height, seem to have 
largely positional value.  While being two metres tall is valuable to a basketball 
player, this is only because most other people are far shorter.  If we were all to 
increase our height to two metres in the hope of becoming basketball players, then 
this height would lose all its positional value, making the enhancements pointless in 
this regard.  While height may have some non-positional value – it’s absolutely 
valuable to be able to reach the apple on the tree – most of its value is positional. 
 
                                                 
5
 Bostrom and Ord, "The Reversal Test." 
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It may seem that most of the value of intelligence is also positional (“what would be 
the status of Eton, Oxford and Cambridge if all could go there?”6).  However, 
Bostrom and Ord make a good case for the significant absolute value of intelligence.  
Although enhancing everyone’s cognitive capacities may not increase my chances of 
getting into Oxford (since I would probably still have the same relative intelligence to 
everyone else), I may be able to better appreciate art and music and have a more 
comprehensive understanding of physics or biology, and therefore of life.  More 
intelligent people may also be good for society.  Bostrom and Ord ask, “why think 
that greater mental faculties would be of no value if everyone shared in the 
improvement?”7 
 
There are a couple of general assumptions that Bostrom and Ord make in order to 
argue in favour of cognitive enhancement.  First, they assume that the method of 
enhancement is genetic engineering.  Second, they assume that the technology used is 
affordable and medically safe (in that it is not immediately dangerous to a subject’s 
health to undergo the enhancement).  We can suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
the enhancement “operation” carries an immediate medical risk similar to a minor 
medical operation, such as a tonsillectomy. 
 
It should be explicitly noted however, that although Bostrom and Ord classify genetic 
cognitive enhancement as “medically safe”, this makes no prediction or evaluation 
about the potential longer-term medical, psychological, political, social or cultural 
consequences that may arise as either a direct or indirect result of enhancement.  The 
point that Bostrom and Ord emphasise is that when making a decision of this nature 
(i.e. a decision under uncertainty), we are faced with a “double epistemic 
predicament”:8 uncertainty about both the probabilities and utilities of the 
consequences. 
 
The double epistemic predicament is not exclusive to cases involving cognitive 
enhancement, but is a factor in many decisions, such as political reform, marriage or 
the choice about where to go to university.  There is no possible way to precisely 
                                                 
6
 Ibid., p.663. 
7
 Ibid., p.664. 
8
 Ibid., p.657. 
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determine the long-term consequences of our decisions, which makes it even harder to 
evaluate those consequences.  What Bostrom and Ord highlight here is that when 
faced with a decision of this type, the judgments we make about the utility of the 
probable consequences “are not based exclusively on hard evidence or rigorous 
statistical inference but rely also – crucially and unavoidably – on subjective, intuitive 
judgment.”9 
 
These unavoidably subjective and intuitive judgments, suggest Bostrom and Ord, can 
be influenced by many kinds of psychological biases.  We must recognise and remove 
these biases in order to improve our ethical evaluations.  Bostrom and Ord contend 
that one specific type of bias – the status quo bias – “may be responsible for much of 
the opposition to human enhancement in general and to genetic cognitive 
enhancement in particular.”10  The status quo bias is defined as “an inappropriate 
(irrational) preference for an option because it preserves the status quo.”11  
 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE OF STATUS QUO BIAS 
Bostrom and Ord examine some of the psychological evidence for existence of the 
status quo bias in human decision making.   
 
In Gilovich et al.’s “Mug Experiment”12 two groups of students were given a survey 
to complete, after which the members of one group were given mugs and the members 
of the other group were given chocolate.  The experimenters then gave the students 
the option of swapping their reward for the one they had not been given.  Around 90 
percent of the students chose to keep the reward they had originally received. 
 
Bostrom and Ord note that although the Mug Experiment seems to indicate the 
existence of a status quo bias, there is another explanation – the endowment effect – 
that can account for the favouring of the status quo in this experiment.  They explain: 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., p.657. 
10
 Ibid., pp.657-658. 
11
 Ibid., p.658. 
12
 See Gilovich et al., Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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We have defined the status quo bias as an inappropriate favoring of the status quo.  
One may speculate that the favoring of the status quo in the Mug Experiment results 
from the subjects forming an emotional attachment to their mug (or chocolate bar).  
An endowment effect of this kind may be a brute fact about human emotions and as 
such may be neither inappropriate nor in any sense irrational.  The subjects may have 
responded rationally to an a-rational fact about their likings.  There is thus an 
alternative explanation of the Mug Experiment which does not involve status quo 
bias.13 
  
While the endowment effect explains that the subjects in the Mug Experiment acted 
rationally when they chose to keep their original gift, it cannot rationally justify a 
moral opposition to genetic cognitive enhancement.  Simply because you preferred to 
keep your chocolate bar does not mean that others should be prevented from swapping 
theirs, if they so desire.  Likewise, the emotional attachment a person has to their own 
cognitive capacities may justify them not becoming cognitively enhanced, but it is 
insufficient to make the moral claim that others also should not be permitted to 
enhance themselves.  A preference for the status quo due to an endowment effect 
cannot be good evidence for the moral evaluation that genetic cognitive enhancement 
should not be permitted.  In this sense, favouring the status quo is inappropriate. 
 
Bostrom and Ord then examine two other studies which they believe can only be 
accounted for by the status quo bias. 
 
In the first study – “Hypothetical Choice Tasks”14 – all participants were asked how 
best to invest a large (imaginary) inheritance.  The potential options for investment 
were: a moderate risk company, a high-risk company, treasury bills or municipal 
bonds.  Some participants were presented with the scenario in a “neutral” version, 
where no status quo was indicated (i.e. the money was not currently invested in any of 
the options).   Other participants had the scenario given with one of the options 
representing the status quo (i.e. with the money already invested in one of the 
                                                 
13
 Bostrom and Ord, "The Reversal Test," p.659 – my italics. 
14
 See William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of 
Risk and Uncertainty 1:1 (1988), pp.7-59. 
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options).  Participants deemed an investment option much more favourable when the 
option represented the status quo.   
 
Similar results were observed in a second study – “Electric Power Consumers”15 – 
where customers were asked which option they considered the best out of six different 
combinations of service reliability and rates.  Over 60 percent of consumers who 
already received high reliability and high rates from their own power company 
indicated a preference for the status quo with only 5.7 percent choosing the option of 
low reliability/low rates.  Likewise, more than 58 percent of subjects with already low 
reliability/low rates chose to maintain the status quo while only 5.8 percent preferred 
high reliability/high rates. 
 
Bostrom and Ord claim that these psychological studies, among many others, indicate 
widespread presence of status quo bias in human decision making.16 
 
One of the major psychological factors identified as a source of status quo bias is 
“loss aversion”.  Loss aversion is a “phenomenon of choice under both risk and 
uncertainty [where] losses loom larger than [corresponding] gains”17 and is captured 
by a value function “that is steeper in the negative than in the positive domain.”18  A 
consequence of loss aversion is that judgments about a particular decision will be 
affected differently depending on whether the problem is framed in terms of gains or 
losses.  To illustrate this phenomenon, Bostrom and Ord use the example of the 
“Asian Disease Problem,”19 where options that were identical in real terms were 
judged differently depending on whether the problem was framed in terms of a gain 
(subjects preferred the safe bet) or in terms of a loss (subjects became risk-seeking) – 
indicating loss aversion. 
                                                 
15
 See Hartman et al., "Consumer Rationality and the Status Quo," Quarterly Journal of Economics 
106:1 (1991), pp.141-62. 
16
 It is not entirely clear that these studies could not show an endowment effect instead of a status quo 
bias.  However, for argument's sake, we should accept the interpretation supplied by Bostrom and Ord.  
Note also, that the endowment effect cannot morally justify opposition to enhancement anyway. 
17
 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, "Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of 
Uncertainty," in Choices, Values and Frames, ed. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.46. 
18
 Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, "Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspective," in Choices, 
Values and Frames (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.481. 
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With relevance to the issue of genetically enhancing intelligence, Bostrom and Ord 
note that “a tendency to overemphasise the avoidance of losses will… favour 
retaining the status quo, resulting in a status quo bias.”20  They argue that positive 
consequences to changes in the status quo will not be given equivalent weight, and 
will therefore be undervalued.  From this point Bostrom and Ord endeavour to 
identify how arguments against genetic cognitive enhancement are influenced by the 
status quo bias, and propose a solution for removing the bias. 
 
THE REVERSAL TEST 
Let’s now return to the moral question under discussion – would enhancing human 
cognitive capacities have net negative or positive consequences?  In attempting to 
remove status quo bias from this judgment, Bostrom and Ord pose a simple but 
challenging question to opponents of cognitive enhancement: should we use genetic 
technologies to decrease our cognitive capacities?  Bostrom and Ord assume that 
nearly all those who oppose increasing our cognitive capacities would also oppose 
decreasing our cognitive capacities.  However, to maintain that we should neither 
decrease nor increase our cognitive capabilities is to imply that our current level of 
intelligence (the status quo) is at its local optimum, and this is a claim that needs 
sound justification.  If no good reasons can be provided, argue Bostrom and Ord, it 
can be assumed that opponents’ judgments about the moral permissibility of genetic 
enhancement technologies have been influenced by the status quo bias, and therefore 
hold little moral weight. 
 
Bostrom and Ord call this heuristic for diagnosing status quo bias the “Reversal Test”:  
 
When a proposal to change a certain parameter is thought to have bad overall 
consequences, consider a change to the same parameter in the opposite direction. If 
this is also thought to have bad overall consequences, then the onus is on those who 
reach these conclusions to explain why our position cannot be improved through 
changes to this parameter. If they are unable to do so, then we have reason to suspect 
that they suffer from status quo bias… The rationale of the Reversal Test is simple: if 
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 21 
a continuous parameter admits of a wide range of possible values, only a tiny subset 
of which can be local optima, then it is prima facie implausible that the actual value 
of that parameter should just happen to be at one of these rare local optima.  This is 
why we claim that the burden of proof shifts to those who maintain that some actual 
parameter is at such a local optimum: they need to provide some good reason for 
supposing that it is so.21 
  
An argument in favour of maintaining the status quo does not automatically suffer 
from status quo bias.  However, it must provide a good justification for opposing 
changes to the status quo. 
 
ARGUMENTS AGAINST COGNITIVE ENHANCEMENT 
Bostrom and Ord critically examine a number of possible responses to the Reversal 
Test in the case of cognitive enhancement.  However, they conclude that all responses 
ultimately fail. 
 
Argument from Evolutionary Adaptation 
One potential strategy for opponents of cognitive enhancement is to argue that the 
current level of intelligence is at its local optimum because evolution has selected for 
that particular value, with higher or lower values being selected against.  Any change 
in the current parameter is therefore suboptimal, since if it were best natural selection 
would have selected for it.  This argument puts the burden of proof back on those who 
advocate a change of the status quo.  In this case, proponents of cognitive 
enhancement will have to show how the argument from evolutionary adaptation is 
ineffective in opposing cognitive enhancement. 
 
Bostrom and Ord suggest several reasons why the argument from evolutionary 
adaptation does not succeed.  First, they argue that our environment is drastically 
changing before evolution has time to “catch up”.  Since our modern environment is 
radically different from our ancestors’ environment, traits that may have once been 
adaptive are adaptive no longer, and vice versa.  For example, a sweet tooth was once 
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a good way to identify high-calorie food in an environment where calorific food was 
limited, but has now become maladaptive, substantially increasing the risks of 
lifestyle-related illnesses like obesity and type 2 diabetes.  Furthermore, while a life in 
the Pleistocene did not require sophisticated abstract skills like knowledge of maths or 
physics, our modern life places great demands on these abilities. 
 
Secondly, evolutionary trade-offs may have made increased brain-power maladaptive, 
even if increased cognitive capacities would have been beneficial.  As an example, 
Bostrom and Ord submit that the metabolic costs potentially associated with increased 
intelligence or brain size are no longer prohibitive since we now have an abundance 
of readily-available food. 
 
Thirdly, they argue that natural selection may not have discovered traits that would be 
adaptive for humans, especially if those traits (like increased cognitive capacity) incur 
an initial fitness penalty (like needing substantial amounts of food to survive).  
However, unlike the blind forces of natural selection, we can now direct genetic 
modifications toward a specific aim. 
 
Fourth, evolution and human happiness or well-being do not necessarily coincide.  
For example, rape and murder may have been evolutionarily adaptive in terms of 
propagating genes but it certainly gives us no reason to think these things are good for 
our lives.  Accordingly, simply because evolution has not brought about higher 
intelligence provides no sound justification for thinking it would not be good for us all 
the same. 
 
Argument from Transition Costs 
The second way in which one may try to meet the Reversal Test’s burden of proof is 
to appeal to transition costs.  In short, even if it were true that intelligence is not at a 
local optimum and enhancing human intelligence would have beneficial 
consequences, if cognitive enhancement would incur substantial transition costs that 
would outweigh its benefits, then we should not increase our cognitive capacity.   
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To illustrate this point Bostrom and Ord consider whether or not the United States 
should adopt the metric system of measurement.  While there is a good case to be 
made that the metric system is much better than the imperial system, there may be 
major transition costs associated with change (such as learning the new system, 
changing school textbooks and buying new measuring equipment), all of which would 
take time, effort and money.  The transition costs may outweigh the benefits, meaning 
that simply regarding the metric system as better does not automatically give us good 
reason to assume that it is in the United States’ best interests to adopt it. 
 
Bostrom and Ord consider the potential transition costs of cognitive enhancement.  
Perhaps school curricula would require modification.  Games and recreational 
activities may need updating because they would become too easy or too boring.  
Family friction may result if very smart children were being raised by less smart 
parents. 
 
However, Bostrom and Ord suggest that worries about these potential transition costs 
are overstated.  “The cost would be one-off while the benefits of enhancement would 
be permanent.”22   Rewriting school curricula already occasionally occurs and 
inventing new games would be simple, they contend.  In fact, most games 
(particularly sports) do not depend on high intelligence to remain exciting or 
enjoyable.  In addition, many children are already much more intelligent than their 
parents, but we tend to consider the potential resulting friction as a minor 
inconvenience compared to the value we place on having smart children. 
 
Argument from Risk 
Although a course of action (such as enhancing intelligence) may have potential 
benefits, if these benefits are relatively low while the potential negatives are relatively 
high, then the prudent course of action would be to maintain the status quo.  While 
intelligence may not be at a local optimum, one may argue against change because of 
the risk that increasing intelligence would bring about a situation worse than the status 
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quo instead of better.  An argument of this sort can potentially meet the Reversal Test 
challenge, although Bostrom and Ord maintain that in this case it fails. 
 
First, Bostrom and Ord submit that cognitive enhancement has a number of obvious 
potential benefits.  Increased intelligence could help further scientific study, eradicate 
poverty, conserve the environment and find cures for diseases.  They argue that rather 
than appropriate levels of risk-aversion weighing heavily on the side of maintaining 
the status quo, the goal of reducing risk may be a good argument in support of 
enhancing intelligence, since higher cognitive capacities may enable us to decrease 
serious medical, social and environmental risks. 
 
Secondly, although some of the long-term effects may be uncertain, they may also be 
“much better than anybody expected.”23  Bostrom and Ord point out that while there 
may be some downsides to cognitive enhancement, in order to determine the expected 
utility we must also consider its upsides.  They submit that perhaps we can not as 
easily imagine the potential benefits of cognitive enhancement as we can the potential 
negatives.  However, there is good reason to believe that the consequences, although 
uncertain, will be good: 
 
Imagine a tribe of Australopithecus debating whether they should enhance their 
intelligence to the level of modern humans. Is there any reason to suppose that they 
would have been able to foresee all the wonderful benefits we are enjoying thanks to 
our improved intellect? Only in retrospect did the myriad technological and social 
gains become apparent. And it would have been even less feasible for an 
Australopithecus to foresee the qualitative changes in our ways of experiencing, 
thinking, doing, and relating that our greater cognitive capacity have enabled, 
including literature, art, music, humour, poetry, and the rest of Mill’s “higher 
pleasures.” All these would have been impossible without our enhanced mental 
capacities; who knows what other wonderful things we are currently missing out on? 
… The uncertainty of the ultimate consequences of cognitive enhancement, far from 
being a sufficient ground for opposing them, is actually a strong consideration in 
their support.24 
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By highlighting the cognitive differences between Australopithecus and Homo 
sapiens, we can more clearly see the great value we place on our higher cognitive 
capacities.  Bostrom and Ord use this comparison in order to postulate the creation of 
comparable benefits if we enhanced our current intelligence to “posthuman”25 levels. 
 
Argument from Person-Affecting Ethics 
However, even if it were true that cognitively enhanced people would lead better 
lives, one may still argue against enhancement from a person-affecting view of ethics.  
One could maintain that we should only: 
 
Maximise the benefits we provide to people who either already exist or who will 
come to exist independently of our decisions. On such views there is no general 
moral reason to bring into existence people whose lives will be very good.  By 
extension, there may be no moral reason to change ourselves into radically different 
sorts of people whose lives would be better than the ones we currently lead.26 
 
However, Bostrom and Ord believe they can counter this sort of argument in the case 
of future people by using a type of Reversal Test.  They appeal to the intuition that we 
should not deliberately select embryos with severe genetic disabilities.  If this 
intuition is right then either there are other non-person-affecting moral considerations 
to take into account (because if these embryos were not chosen then the disabled 
person in question would not even exist), or it is the case that selecting severely 
disabled embryos would negatively impact people who already exist.  On either 
account, the Reversal Test shifts the burden of proof back onto opponents of cognitive 
enhancement to show why the grounds for opposing a decrease in cognitive capacities 
do not also act as grounds in favour of increasing cognitive capacities. 
 
The same kind of Reversal Test can be used in the case of people who already exist.  
If we believe it would be a bad idea to deliberately lower our own intelligence, then 
we should also accept that it would be a good idea to increase our intelligence, or else 
justify why our current cognitive capacities are at their local optimum. 
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It should be noted, however, that Bostrom and Ord recognise that use of the Reversal 
Test as an objection to person-affecting arguments against cognitive enhancement 
carries more weight in cases of slight or moderate enhancements than in the case of 
significant enhancements.  This is because a person who has undergone a radical 
enhancement might effectively become a completely different person from the one 
who existed before.  The enhancement would arguably have then been bad for the 
original person, since it caused them to no longer exist.  However, Bostrom and Ord 
argue that since we do not consider it is bad for children to grow up, despite the fact 
that they become radically different people, why should we think it is bad for 
ourselves to undergo radical cognitive enhancements? 
 
RESPONDING TO THE REVERSAL TEST 
From their evaluations of the arguments from evolutionary adaptation, transition 
costs, risk and person-affecting ethics, Bostrom and Ord conclude that the strongest 
potential arguments against enhancement are not robust enough to successfully pass 
the Reversal Test.  However, I present a more effective argument against the use of 
genetic cognitive enhancements in chapter 3, which meets the initial burden of proof 
set by Bostrom and Ord’s Reversal Test.  I then go on to defend this argument against 
potential objections in chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Case against Cognitive Enhancement 
 
 
 
 
THE REVERSAL TEST CHALLENGE 
The Reversal Test is a burden of proof argument and as such, it is very compelling.  
Assuming that most opponents of the genetic enhancement of intelligence would also 
oppose decreases in intelligence, it puts the onus on those who contend that cognitive 
enhancement would be worse than the status quo to offer good reason for holding 
intelligence to be at a local optimum.  The goal of this chapter is to meet this initial 
burden of proof.  However, I do not intend to argue that improvements in intelligence 
could not be beneficial to the enhanced individual.  Instead, I will contend that the 
likely unequal distribution of cognitive enhancements will have negative effects on 
those who cannot afford them.  Permitting enhancements would therefore be unjust. 
 
I will not argue my case against cognitive enhancement against every conceivable 
objection here.  While I will respond to the strongest objections to my argument in 
chapter 4, it is not the point of this chapter.  What I do intend to establish in this 
chapter is that my opposition to enhancement is not influenced by the status quo bias 
– this will meet the Reversal Test’s initial burden of proof.  By responding to potential 
objections in chapter 4 I will then show that the arguments I offer here are sound. 
  
However, before defending my case against cognitive enhancement, I will briefly 
discuss a few possible responses to the Reversal Test.  Although I will ultimately 
reject these arguments, they are worth mentioning, if only to notify the reader of their 
potential use. 
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Possible Responses to the Reversal Test 
In their paper Bostrom and Ord critically evaluate a number of potential responses to 
the Reversal Test, all of which they argue are ultimately unsatisfactory.  Although I 
will later discuss considerations of risk, I will not pursue the argument from 
evolutionary adaptation or the argument from person-affecting ethics, as I grant that 
Bostrom and Ord (and others27) have provided adequate responses to these.  In 
relation to the argument from transition costs, I wish to briefly note that the cost of 
enhancement does not occur once in total; rather, each instance of enhancement incurs 
its own one-off cost.  I will return to this point later. 
 
A potentially effective way to counter Bostrom and Ord’s Reversal Test is to advance 
an argument against enhancement that has a deontological component.  Some such 
arguments that have been proposed include the “playing God” objection,28 Michael 
Sandel’s “openness to the unbidden” argument,29 Leon Kass’s appeal to the “wisdom 
of repugnance”30 and Francis Fukuyama’s contention that genetic enhancement goes 
against human nature.31  Bostrom and Ord note that since the Reversal Test cannot 
diagnose cognitive biases in deontological arguments against enhancement, non-
consequentialist considerations may indeed be able to pass the test.  However, where 
objections to enhancement are in part based on its purported consequences (as is the 
case with Sandel’s), the Reversal Test should be able to diagnose status quo bias if 
and when it is present.32 
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However appealing any of the above concerns are for the opponent of cognitive 
enhancement, it will not be my method to appeal to them here.  One reason for this is 
that many of these arguments have already been extensively discussed in the literature 
on the subject.33  Furthermore, simply for argument’s sake I will grant that these 
popular concerns do not provide an adequate response to the Reversal Test.  The 
reason for granting this concession is to establish that regardless of whether the above 
concerns are fully persuasive, the Reversal Test can be better met, and enhancements 
objected to, by a more compelling argument.  In the rest of this chapter I contend that 
the probable distribution of cognitive enhancements will be likely to cause serious 
injustices to the worst-off members of society. 
 
In order to defend this claim, I first present a method to show that wealth-based access 
to enhancement technologies (i.e. the private purchase of enhancements) would result 
in an unequal distribution of cognitive enhancements between the rich and the poor.  I 
then introduce a principle of distributive justice, the ‘no harm principle’, which I 
argue is a plausible way of governing the distribution of genetic enhancement 
technologies.  The no harm principle states that policies that benefit already well-off 
members of society are prima facie unjust if they risk serious harm to the worst-off 
members of society.  I argue that since genetic enhancements are likely to seriously 
harm the poor if accessed mainly by the rich, their use is unjust according to the no 
harm principle.  This gives us a prima facie reason to prohibit cognitive 
enhancements. 
 
I contend that the unequal distribution of genetic enhancements would be likely to 
harm the poor in three ways.  First, through an increased likelihood of serious 
discrimination; second, the unenhanced poor would be likely to lose valuable social 
and political reciprocal relationships; and third, the positional advantages conferred on 
the enhanced by higher intelligence may competitively harm the poor, leaving them 
worse off in absolute terms. 
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Once I have shown why permitting wealth-based access to genetic cognitive 
enhancement is prima facie unjust, I consider some potential responses that could be 
made on behalf of the proponent of enhancement.  However, I conclude that any 
plausible arguments that could be made in support of enhancement are ultimately 
ineffective.  We can conclude, therefore, that permitting wealth-based access to 
genetic cognitive enhancement is all-things-considered unjust.  Accordingly, it should 
not be permitted. 
 
I then discuss a revised version of the Reversal Test.  However, it too does not lead us 
to conclude that my opposition to enhancement is influenced by status quo bias. 
 
I begin by showing why wealth-based access to genetic cognitive enhancements 
would result in the unequal distribution of enhancements between the rich and the 
poor. 
 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF ENHANCEMENTS 
One of the presuppositions under which Bostrom and Ord set their argument is that 
genetic cognitive enhancement would be “affordable”.  However, this assumption is 
problematic in two ways.  First, and most obviously, as a practical rather than ideal 
matter, affordability is unlikely to be achievable, since enhancements would probably 
be very expensive and therefore unaffordable for most people.  Secondly, 
enhancements are likely to remain unequally distributed between the rich and poor 
even if the ideal condition of affordability is met, since “affordability” is a relative 
term and does not always translate into “accessibility”.  The term “affordable” is often 
used to refer to goods and services that are not only accessible to the rich; however, 
goods that are inaccessible to the poor may still be considered affordable.  For 
example, many New Zealanders would consider computers affordable, yet for those in 
the lowest socio-economic bracket a computer is probably not affordable.  Similarly, 
in developed countries asthma medication and clean water are both affordable but to 
many people around the world these things are neither affordable nor accessible.    
Given these problems, wealth-based access to genetic cognitive enhancements is 
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likely to result in an unequal distribution of enhancements between the rich and the 
poor. 
 
Enhancements Costly and Technologically Complicated 
Even leaving aside the considerable difficulties associated with developing 
enhancement technologies, both somatic and germline genetic enhancements are 
likely to be technologically complicated to administer.  Somatic enhancement of 
intelligence would require that the introduced gene makes it into all or a majority of 
the enhancement candidate’s brain cells.  Germ-line enhancement would require that 
the ovum (before conception), zygote or blastomere (after conception) is enhanced.  
This means that the ovum must be extracted, enhanced, then fertilised (or fertilised, 
then enhanced) before being implanted back into the womb. 
 
New and complicated technologies are not cheap.  For example, today in New 
Zealand, over 30 years after the first successful in vitro fertilisation (IVF) pregnancy, 
one cycle of IVF still costs around NZ$10,000 to $12,000.34  The cost of both somatic 
and germline enhancements would reflect the cost of their development and the 
technological difficulty associated with their administration.  This is likely to be much 
higher than the cost of IVF, given the technological advances required.  However, 
even if enhancements eventually cost a similar amount to IVF today, at $10,000 it is 
clear that many New Zealanders (and most people in developing countries) would be 
unable to afford them.  Wealth-based access to enhancements would therefore result 
in radical differences in uptake rates between the rich and the poor. 
 
It has been suggested that this unequal distribution could be somewhat mitigated by 
germline engineering.35  Since any enhancement would be heritable, an initially 
incomplete distribution of genetic enhancements could potentially have much wider 
effects, given time.  However, relying on germline engineering to help distribute the 
effects of cognitive enhancement more widely is not a viable solution to access 
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problems.  First, germline enhancements may be no less expensive than somatic 
enhancements and therefore no less unevenly distributed.  Second, the wider-reaching 
effects of germline enhancement would take generations to be properly realised, since 
any significant indirect enhancement effects would not be felt until the children and 
grandchildren are born.  Third, while the initial individual’s enhancement would be 
passed down to their descendants, by then it is likely that the wealthy would have 
access to even better enhancement technologies.  Fourth, families originally too poor 
to afford enhancements or (relevant to the global case) living in remote regions where 
enhancements are not available would be more likely to have offspring who also 
could not afford enhancements.  We may then see access problems through a family 
line. 
 
Subsidisation of Enhancements 
A proponent of enhancement may instead suggest that non-wealth-based access to 
enhancement technologies would provide a solution to the prohibitive cost of 
cognitive enhancements for the less well-off.  Returning to the IVF analogy, it may be 
pointed out that while IVF is expensive, the New Zealand government is able to fund 
up to two cycles for couples who meet specific criteria. The proponent of 
enhancement may therefore conclude that similar public funding of genetic 
enhancement technologies would ensure their widespread accessibility.  Another 
potential solution is if the wealthy were permitted to purchase any enhancement they 
were willing to fully subsidise for the poor.36 
 
In his book Citizen Cyborg, James Hughes agrees with the prediction that 
enhancements would be publicly funded.  He evaluates Lee Silver’s contention that 
unequal access to genetic enhancements could lead to a division between the 
“GenRich” and the “GenPoor”: 
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If genetic enhancement were to become possible, democratic publics would take to 
the streets with knives and guns before allowing Silver’s scenario to come to pass.  
The lower and middle classes would insist that their children be provided with the 
same eugenic enhancements available to the children of the rich.  In time, the U.S. 
government would subsidize eugenic programmes, not to create an overclass but to 
preserve equality, to elevate everyone’s natural endowments.37   
 
It seems to me, however, that these predictions are grossly optimistic.  In the United 
States alone the latest figures show 47 million people without health insurance.38  
Until we see rioting in America over universal health care, we can be reasonably 
confident that universal access to enhancements is unlikely.   
 
Furthermore, while the New Zealand government subsidises IVF for couples who 
meet specific criteria, full subsidisation of enhancements39 at the same price as IVF (a 
very conservative estimate) would cost the country $40 billion – about one third of 
New Zealand’s GDP40 and four times the annual health budget.41  This figure does not 
include the enhancement of the roughly 57,000 babies born each year42 or the cost of 
enhancing immigrants.  Furthermore, while the initial enhancement may incur a one-
off financial cost, each further enhancement would also be prohibitively expensive, 
given that technology does not remain static.  A program that required the wealthy to 
fully subsidise any enhancements they want for the poor is similarly problematic.  
The cost of subsidisation means that the only reasonable assumption we can make is 
that enhancements would be unequally distributed between the rich and poor. 
                                                 
37
 Here Hughes relates Adam Wolfson's evaluation of Lee Silver.  James Hughes, Citizen Cyborg: Why 
Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the Future (United States of America: 
Westview Press, 2004), p.133. 
38
 National Coalition on Health Care, "Health Insurance Coverage," 
http://www.nchc.org/facts/coverage.shtml. 
39
 This calculation assumes that around 4 million New Zealanders would undergo enhancements.  And 
while some may reject enhancements for religious or cultural reasons, I cannot imagine that this will be 
a significant proportion of the population.  However, even if many people did choose to opt out, the 
cost of enhancement for the rest of New Zealand still seems likely to be far too high for public funding 
to be practically achievable.  Furthermore, the more people who choose to opt out of enhancement, the 
less likely public opinion will be in favour of taxpayer funding for those who opt in. 
40
 Statistics New Zealand, "Gross Domestic Product," http://www.stats.govt.nz/products-and-
services/hot-off-the-press/gross-domestic-product/gross-domestic-product-jun08qtr-
hotp.htm?page=para004Master. 
41
 Pete Hodgson, "Budget 06: A Health Budget for All NZ Families," beehive.govt.nz, 18 May 2006, 
http://www.beehive.govt.nz/?q=node/25799. 
42
 Statistics New Zealand, "Births and Deaths: June 2006 Quarter," 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/store/2006/08/births-deaths-jun06qtr-hotp.htm?page=para003Master. 
 
 
 34 
 
The statistics are sufficient to show the implausibility of Hughes’ claim applied 
globally: 19 percent – nearly 1 billion people – of the World’s population subsists on 
less than US$1 per day;43 inequality both within and between countries has risen;44 
many developed countries, such as New Zealand, are failing to live up to their 
international obligations for overseas development aid;45 and while vaccination rates 
in developed countries are above 95 percent, they barely reach 20 percent in many 
developing countries.46  The enormous economic disparities between the rich World 
and the poor World mean that even if the ideal condition of affordable enhancements 
were achieved in developed countries, cognitive enhancements would remain 
unaffordable and inaccessible for the majority of people in developing countries.  
This would create serious problems of global justice. 
 
The prohibitive cost of enhancements means that permitting only non-wealth-based 
access to enhancement technologies would effectively amount to a ban on any 
enhancement worth pursuing.  Wealth-based access to enhancements therefore 
represents the only likely scenario for the introduction of genetic enhancement.  So, 
while proponents of enhancement, like Hughes, are entitled to espouse its benefits to 
support their arguments, they are not entitled to make fanciful predictions, like 
assumptions of universal access, which are so unlikely to be borne out.   
 
Economic factors may not be the only influences on the uptake rate of enhancements.  
Perhaps cultural beliefs will deter people from genetically enhancing themselves or 
their children.  Currently the evidence in support of this idea is mixed, with some 
studies suggesting that cultural barriers do play a role in determining the uptake rates 
of vaccinations47 and other studies indicating that these statistics can be better 
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explained by poverty.48  However, we must be careful not to place too much moral 
emphasis on the issue of cultural barriers, since it is access to rather than the use of 
cognitive enhancements that we should seek to maximise.  It should be within a 
person’s legitimate right to bodily integrity to refuse cognitive enhancement, whatever 
their reasons for doing so. 
 
This analysis shows that while Bostrom and Ord postulate “affordability”, we cannot 
consider anything but unequal access to enhancements to be a real life practical 
probability.  We must morally evaluate the use of enhancements under predicted real 
life conditions, since it is real rather than ideal conditions that lead to either good or 
bad consequences for people.  Accordingly, our moral assessment of the use of 
wealth-based access to genetic cognitive enhancements should be made with the 
expectation that they will be unequally distributed between the rich and the poor. 
 
THE ‘NO HARM PRINCIPLE’ 
So far I have advanced the position that wealth-based access to genetic enhancements 
would result in radically different uptake rates between the rich and the poor.  At this 
stage, a proponent of enhancement may ask, “what’s wrong with an unequal 
distribution of cognitive enhancements?”  The answer to this question will be 
concerned with what counts as a just distribution of goods.  If the distribution of 
cognitive enhancements is likely to cause injustice, then we have good reason to 
prohibit them. 
 
It is not my goal in this thesis to extensively debate the merits of a particular principle 
of distributive justice.  Instead, I start by introducing a moral principle that we can 
accept as intuitively plausible, and I then show how we can apply this principle to the 
case of cognitive enhancement.  And, it is clear that on a number of plausible 
conceptions of distributive justice, wealth-based access to genetic cognitive 
                                                                                                                                            
25:43 (2007); Danielle C. Ompad et al., "Distribution of Influenza Vaccine to High-Risk Groups," 
Epidemiologic Reviews 28:1 (2006); Ellyn Micco et al., "Differential Willingness to Undergo Smallpox 
Vaccination among African-American and White Individuals," Journal of General Internal Medicine 
19:5 Pt 1 (2004). 
48
 Elizabeth T. Luman et al., "Uptake of Varicella Vaccination among Young Children in the United 
States: A Success Story in Eliminating Racial and Ethnic Disparities," Pediatrics 117:4 (2006). 
 
 
 36 
enhancements would not be permitted.  If this is the case, then it provides a 
compelling response to the Reversal Test.  So, in what follows, I will introduce a 
moral principle to motivate the idea that the unequal distribution of enhancements is 
morally different from the unequal distribution of other goods (such as expensive 
cars).  In the rest of the chapter I will illustrate precisely why genetic cognitive 
enhancements should be prohibited according to this principle. 
 
I should also briefly note at this point that the principles of distributive justice I will 
consider are meant to govern our background social institutions.  So, while these 
principles should guide the distribution of cognitive enhancement technologies, they 
do not require people to redistribute or necessarily compensate for their natural 
cognitive endowments. 
 
One potential strategy we could take is to adopt a Rawlsian view of distributive 
justice.  A Rawlsian may use the difference principle to argue that inequalities in 
access to certain social primary goods (in this case genetic enhancements) should only 
be permitted if the distribution benefits the worst-off.49 
 
The idea of primary goods is a valuable one.  A primary good is a good that every 
rational person should want, regardless of their life goals and interests.  For example, 
income is a primary good, because for whatever a person wants to do in life, a greater 
income is nearly always more useful in achieving those goals than a lesser income.  
On the other hand, musical talent is not a primary good, since it is irrelevant for the 
effective realisation of most goals.  Following Rawls, I will take it that we should be 
concerned with the distribution of primary goods.50 
 
It is in line with Rawls to consider intelligence a primary good.  Being intelligent is 
almost always beneficial, no matter what goals a person wishes to achieve.  This idea 
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makes it clearer, now, why I wanted to exclude such abilities as musical talent in my 
discussion of cognitive enhancement.51 
 
The difference principle would consider unjust a policy that benefited already well-
off sections of the population but had no effect on the worst-off sections of society.  
However, it is at least arguable that a policy that benefits some and harms no one 
ought to be permitted.  A potential problem with the difference principle, then, is that 
it does not capture the intuitive idea that a world where some people are benefited is 
better than a world where no people are benefited, all else being equal.52 
 
Nevertheless, we can soften the difference principle in favour of another principle that 
does capture these intuitions.  We can motivate a criticism of the unequal distribution 
of genetic enhancement by appealing to the strong moral intuition that a policy that 
benefits people who are already well-off but that harms the less well-off is inherently 
unfair.  We can call this the ‘no harm principle’ of distributive justice.  The no harm 
principle can be described more precisely as: 
 
A policy that benefits already well-off members of society but harms the worst-off 
members of society is prima facie unjust. 
 
Under the no harm principle, it is prima facie morally permissible to allow the 
wealthy to purchase genetic enhancements to benefit themselves, as long as their 
doing so is not harmful to those who cannot afford the enhancements.  It is prima 
facie unjust to allow the wealthy to do so if this does harm the worst-off.  For 
example, if the non-universal use of cognitive enhancements created a society like 
that depicted in Gattaca, where the unenhanced were prevented from being employed 
in any area except menial work, then this would be unjust according to the no harm 
principle.  If the use of cognitive enhancements by the wealthy increased relative 
inequality but left the poor just as well off in absolute terms, then the no harm 
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principle would consider it just to permit wealth-based access to cognitive 
enhancements. 
 
Using the no harm principle rather than the difference principle to motivate an 
argument against cognitive enhancement sets a harder task for opponents of 
enhancement.  The no harm principle must show not only that permitting wealth-
based access to enhancements would fail to benefit the worst-off but that it would also 
harm the worst-off.  As I have stated, my goal is not to extensively defend the no 
harm principle against other possible principles of distributive justice.  Instead, I make 
the claim that we can accept the no harm principle as intuitively plausible.  The no 
harm principle can then be employed to make a case against the use of genetic 
cognitive enhancement and so provide a compelling response to the Reversal Test (i.e. 
show that opposition to enhancements based on the no harm principle is not 
influenced by the status quo bias). 
 
I will now briefly describe how we should handle considerations of risk under 
uncertainty.  I will then show precisely how permitting wealth-based access to genetic 
cognitive enhancement would be likely to harm the poor and therefore be unjust 
according to the no harm principle. 
 
Risk under Uncertainty  
In chapter 2 I noted Bostrom and Ord’s assertion that uncertainty about the 
consequences of genetic enhancement weigh more favourably on the side of 
permitting enhancement rather than prohibiting it.  They support this assertion by 
appealing to the individual benefits of enhancement (highlighted by the 
Australopithecus example) and noting enhancement’s potential social benefits 
(scientific, medical, environmental, social and economic). 
 
However, my conclusions are very different.  I argue instead that the harms to the 
poor weigh heavily in favour of prohibiting cognitive enhancement.  This is because 
while the Reversal Test assumes a situation where everyone in society is cognitively 
enhanced, the actual distribution of enhancements will almost certainly be unequal.  
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This creates the potential for serious moral, social, political and economic harms to 
those who miss out.  So, we cannot appeal to its individual benefits (as Bostrom and 
Ord do) to support the contention that enhancements will be beneficial, as the no harm 
principle is primarily concerned about consequences for those who do not become 
enhanced.  Furthermore, the social benefits of enhanced intelligence may not be as 
great as Bostrom and Ord claim (I will return to this point later).  While of course the 
conclusions I will draw will be somewhat speculative, I will establish that wealth-
based access to enhancements poses a real and substantial risk of harm to the poor.  
Illustrating precisely how unequal access to cognitive enhancements is likely to have 
negative consequences for the unenhanced should be given more weight than Bostrom 
and Ord’s predicted but undefined good consequences.  
 
I will not rely on any particular conception of risk-aversion or method of dealing with 
risk under uncertainty.  So, I do not intend my arguments against enhancement to 
conform to support a sort of precautionary principle that requires enhancement’s 
proponents to guarantee the non-universal use of enhancements will not harm the 
poor.  However, I maintain that once I have illustrated precisely how harms may arise, 
the onus is then on proponents of enhancement to present good reason for thinking 
these harms can be avoided (although I do not think they will be able to do this).  The 
goal of this chapter, then, is to show that harm to the poor constitutes a real and 
serious possibility, not that the harms are certain to occur.  The initial no harm 
principle can therefore be altered to state: 
 
A policy that benefits already well-off members of society but carries a significant 
risk of harm to the worst-off members of society is prima facie unjust.   
 
In the rest of this chapter I will show how wealth-based access to genetic 
enhancements would be likely to harm the poor in three ways.  First, the worst-off 
would be at a significant risk of harm through discrimination, because the cognitively 
enhanced would be likely to equate their biologically superior intellectual capacities 
with moral superiority.  Second, if cognitive enhancement increased its users’ 
intelligence by a substantial degree, the unenhanced would also be likely to lose 
valuable reciprocal social and political relationships.  Third, because of the 
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considerable positional value of intelligence, the poor would be at risk of suffering 
competitive harms that would leave them worse off in absolute terms. 
 
DISCRIMINATION 
The unequal distribution caused by permitting wealth-based access to cognitive 
enhancements gives rise to a major moral concern: that the unenhanced will suffer 
serious discrimination as a result.  If already well-off members of society are 
enhanced to be more intelligent than the rest, “what kinds of decisions would then 
flow from a (warranted?) belief in biological/genetic superiority?”53  I argue in line 
with Søren Holm – that the enhanced would be likely to equate their biologically 
“better” intellectual capacities with the moral or value notion of “better.”54 
 
Personhood Criteria for Moral Equality 
James Hughes presents an argument that he believes will ensure a society consisting 
of both humans and posthumans would be one of moral equality.  Hughes argues that 
the conception of moral equality should not be founded on an individual’s biological 
capacities.  Instead, he maintains that plants, animals, humans and posthumans should 
all be evaluated on the same criteria inherent in the notion of “personhood”. 
 
Hughes does not commit to choosing the specific requirements for personhood, but he 
does make some suggestions as to the sort of criteria that would be important.  They 
include: the ability to feel pain or suffer; self-awareness; the capacity for mature 
reflection; reason and rationality; thought and conscience; and empathy (a capacity he 
suggests is essential to the expression of the other proposed criteria for personhood).55  
Hughes contends that on whichever of these plausible criteria one chooses, citizenship 
and moral equality should be accorded to “persons” rather than “humans” or 
“posthumans”.  Holding a personhood view of equality would ensure that the 
enhanced and the unenhanced recognise each other as worthy of full moral respect.   
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While I fully agree with Hughes’ assertion that a biological criterion like 
“humanness” is irrelevant for determining whether two individuals have equal moral 
status, I believe his analysis of the situation is flawed.  The mistake Hughes makes is 
his assumption that personhood will be as important in determining moral status to 
enhanced humans as it is for philosophers like Peter Singer, or for Hughes himself.  
 
The fundamental problem with Hughes’s argument is that he seems to conflate 
normative issues with descriptive issues about equality.  That is, he implies that 
because moral equality should be founded on the basis of personhood, then we can be 
confident that it will be founded on the basis of personhood in a posthuman society.  
However, although according to personhood theorists, irrelevant biological traits like 
“humanness” or “posthumanness” should not be used to determine who has equal 
moral status, this does not mean that these traits will not be used to do so.  Hughes 
quotes the transhumanist writer Ron Bailey: 
 
Political equality has never rested on claims about human biology.  After all, 
humanity had the same biology we have today during the long millennia in which 
slavery, patriarchy, and aristocratic rule were social norms.  With respect to political 
equality, genetic differences, even engineered differences, are differences that make 
no difference.56 
 
However, as a descriptive claim (which is what we should be concerned with when 
trying to evaluate the predicted real life consequences of enhancement), it is simply 
not true that “political equality has never rested on claims about human biology”, as 
many of the examples chosen to illustrate this claim show clearly.  Slavery, racism 
and the Jim Crow laws were largely justified on the grounds of blacks’ supposed 
biologically inferior intellectual capacities.57  Women were denied suffrage and equal 
rights in large part because they were considered to be incapable of the levels of 
reason and rationality attained by men.58  History is replete with cases of moral and 
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political equality being denied on the grounds that genetic sameness in intellectual 
capacity (whether real or imagined) is a determining requirement of equal moral or 
political consideration. 
 
It is not only different cognitive capacities that seem to justify discrimination, but that 
these differences are thought to be substantially genetically/biologically caused.59  
And although environmental factors also influence intellectual capacity, cognitive 
differences perceived to be caused by the environment do not seem to generate the 
same claims of moral superiority.  For example, it was because blacks and women 
were thought to have innately inferior intellects that they were denied equal rights, not 
because these supposed differences were thought to be caused by a lack of schooling, 
for example. 
 
If the wealthy became cognitively enhanced in comparison to the rest of society then 
they may very well wrongly equate their biologically superior cognitive capacities 
with moral superiority.  If perceived but imaginary differences in intellectual capacity 
between groups have been so often used to justify racism and sexism, then it seems 
that genuine, deliberately created differences will cause the enhanced to make similar 
claims about their moral superiority.  The proponent of enhancement must be 
prepared to show why the real intellectual differences created through wealth-based 
access to cognitive enhancements will not be used to justify unequal moral 
consideration if imaginary differences have so often been used to justify such 
discrimination in the past. 
 
Substantial intellectual differences created through an unequal distribution of 
cognitive enhancement would be very morally troubling in this regard.  In fact, many 
proponents of enhancement, like Bostrom and Ord, do advocate significant increases 
in our cognitive capacities (such as raising our level of intelligence by the same 
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degree that humans are smarter than Australopithecus).  Moreover, even small initial 
enhancements would have a large effect on intelligence given time, assuming either a 
cumulative effect of successively small enhancements or that enhancement 
technologies become increasingly more powerful.  
 
Consider the way that non-human animals are currently treated in most societies.  
While some philosophers, most notably Singer,60 argue for the equal moral 
consideration of animals and humans, this is not a widely held belief either among the 
public or among law-makers, and it is certainly not widely practiced.  In fact, Singer 
is often taken to be an extremist by the mainstream press. 
 
The issue of animal rights highlights our general failure to realise that the notion of 
equality is a prescriptive notion rather than a descriptive one.  The existence of factory 
farms, sow crates, vivisection and cosmetics testing all highlight the fact that many 
supposedly morally important factors, like sentience, are largely ignored.61  Instead, 
rejection of the idea that animals deserve greater moral respect is justified by 
appealing to their biologically inferior cognitive capacities (“animals don’t have the 
capacity for rationality or the ability to recognise moral duties”).62   
 
While there has undoubtedly been progress on all fronts – in both racial and sexual 
equality and animal rights63 – I submit to the reader that we do not yet live in a society 
where moral equality is determined on the basis of personhood rather than biology.  It 
would be a mistake to rely on enhanced humans applying a personhood theory of 
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moral equality, especially given the serious nature of the potential harm to the poor if 
the enhanced fail to do so.  Engineering a group to be cognitively superior creates a 
substantial risk of discrimination against those who are not biologically and 
intellectually equal. 
 
Smarter Humans Equals Better Reasoning? 
However, it might be objected that the enhanced’s greater cognitive capacities would 
make them more likely to make consistent moral judgments and so recognise that a 
genetic predisposition for higher intelligence is irrelevant for determining moral 
equality.  In a smarter society, perhaps citizens would be less likely to make the 
mistake of equivocating between two different senses of the word “better”.  Nicholas 
Agar makes a similar proposition: “[the enhanced’s] greater powers of reasoning may 
make them less susceptible to inconsistencies in moral judgement.”64 
 
While these observations may turn out to be correct, there is still a significant 
possibility that the enhanced’s greater intellectual capacities will not cause them to be 
consistently better moral agents.  If normal humans have so often attempted to create 
differences when there were none, the actual differences created by unequal cognitive 
enhancements may make the enhanced even more susceptible to the judgment that 
differences in biology and intellect justify differences in moral status.  It is also 
concerning that the greater intellectual capacities of the enhanced may enable them to 
easily take advantage of those who are cognitively inferior. 
 
The seriousness of the potential harms also lends weight to the view that we should 
err on the side of caution.  By permitting wealth-based access to enhancements, 
society puts its most vulnerable at risk of great harm in order to benefit its least 
vulnerable.  Perhaps this risk could be justified if enhancements were to benefit those 
who are already badly-off.  However, the serious nature of the potential harms to the 
worst-off, coupled with the fact that the wealthy are, in absolute terms, very well-off 
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already, supports taking a more conservative approach when considering whether we 
should permit wealth-based access to cognitive enhancements. 
 
What I have suggested here is not a science fiction fantasy – it is the logical extension 
of knowledge about biased attitudes that have pervaded society in the past and that 
continue to exist.  While it is unlikely wealthy parents will ever engineer themselves 
or their children to carry saddles on their backs, the wealthy’s enhancement may 
instead endow them with boots and spurs.65  And, although we cannot know for 
certain whether the enhanced will consider the unenhanced as morally inferior, I have 
provided convincing reasons to suppose that they will in fact hold this belief.  I would 
suggest that the onus is at least on the proponent of enhancement to provide evidence 
to the contrary – that the enhanced’s better intellectual capacities will make them 
morally better as well.  However, this is a burden that proponents of enhancement 
have not successfully overcome. 
 
RECIPROCITY 
The problem of maintaining moral equality in a society where access to cognitive 
enhancement is unequal is a serious one.  A society’s failure to accord full moral 
recognition to all its members will cause those who are judged to be less deserving of 
moral respect to be denied equal economic, social and political rights.  However, even 
if the enhanced did recognise the unenhanced as morally valuable, there is still good 
reason to be concerned about the unenhanced’s potential marginalisation.  Nicholas 
Agar notes that “the problem is that full moral relationships involve more than just 
acknowledging the moral value of others.  They require reciprocity.”66  While Agar’s 
concern is for moral relationships, I submit that reciprocity is especially important in 
maintaining social and political relationships. 
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Political and social reciprocity are extremely important to all individuals within a 
society, especially the most vulnerable.  Which members are recognised in these 
relationships determines, among other things, who counts as a member of a political 
or social community, who is entitled to political rights or to seek positions of office 
(and therefore who has the right to self-determination), and who is an appropriate 
recipient for the distribution of social goods. 
 
Agar compares the relationship between two citizens to the relationship between a pet 
owner and their pet.  Although the pet owner may not ignore the moral worth of their 
pet, the relationship is not a reciprocal one, unlike the relationship between two fellow 
citizens: 
 
Citizenship is a collective enterprise founded on the shared understanding of co-
operation’s great importance.  We count a few marginal persons, such as the 
extremely young, elderly or sick, as citizens because we know this relatively minor 
extension preserves the motivating ideal.  An entire class of unenhanced Naturals 
might not be so easily subsumed under a general rule of reciprocity… Perhaps the 
enhanced reasoning powers of the GenRich will not permit them to ignore the needs 
of those from whom they do not benefit, but they will grant them something short of 
full recognition.  They will not treat them as full partners in the creation of social 
goods.67 
 
If wealth-based access to cognitive enhancements made those with access very 
different from those without, then it may become impossible for the enhanced and the 
unenhanced to recognise one another in cooperative social and political relationships.  
The harms to those who cannot afford enhancements may be considerable.  The 
unenhanced may be: excluded from schemes of distributive justice, if they had little of 
economic value to offer society; prohibited from seeking positions of office, if they 
are judged to be intellectually deficient to govern; and denied social and political 
rights, such as voting rights, if they are deemed to be rationally deficient.  The 
enhanced would not necessarily need to consider themselves morally superior in order 
to do this – perhaps the enhanced would see good reason to prevent the unenhanced 
from seeking positions of office if they really were less capable of governing.  
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Permitting wealth-based access to genetic cognitive enhancements may therefore 
cause the poor to lose many valuable forms of social and political cooperation. 
 
Buchanan et al. voice a similar concern: 
 
The threat to the political fabric of a liberal society comes from the communities 
coming to believe that they no longer share a common human nature… [The 
enhancement of some] might result in different communities coming to view their 
differences as no longer the result merely of commitment and persuasion, but of their 
different “natures,” with the result that these differences come to be regarded as 
irreconcilable.68 
 
Although differences between groups in today’s society already exist, wealth-based 
access to cognitive enhancement may cause the enhanced to see themselves as 
fundamentally different from the unenhanced.  This may “undermine the possibility of 
social cooperation among communities within a liberal State in a way that traditional 
pluralism does not.”69   
 
An increase in intelligence that resulted in a similar degree of cognitive difference 
between the enhanced and the unenhanced as there currently is between a human and 
an ape, as is advocated by Bostrom and Ord, would create differences far too great for 
relationships between those with access to enhancements and those without to remain 
reciprocal.  The importance of maintaining reciprocal social and political relationships 
speaks strongly in favour of making sure enhancements do not make their possessors 
so different from others as to sever all reciprocity.  Unequal use of enhancements of 
the kind supported by Bostrom and Ord would be almost certain to negate the 
possibility of reciprocation between the enhanced and the unenhanced.  Permitting 
wealth-based access to these sorts of enhancements would therefore constitute a 
severe harm to the unenhanced poor. 
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COMPETITIVE HARMS 
The third sort of harm to the worst-off that may occur through permitting wealth-
based access to genetic enhancement is competitive harm.  In order to fully 
understand why competitive harms are likely to arise, it is helpful to examine the 
different ways in which intelligence can be said to have value. 
 
The Value of Intelligence 
The first value distinction we can make is the individual/social distinction.  
Intelligence may be valuable for the individual whose intelligence is enhanced (e.g. 
being able to learn a new language) or intelligence may be valuable for society (e.g. 
an individual’s higher intelligence enables them to find a cure for a common disease). 
 
Secondly, we can make a distinction between intrinsic value (intelligence is valuable 
in itself) and extrinsic value, sometimes called instrumental value (intelligence is 
valuable because it helps to bring about some desirable state of affairs).  There are 
two ways to think about intelligence in this respect.  One view is that intelligence is 
completely extrinsically valuable – it is valuable for individuals because it enables 
them to do other intrinsically valuable things with their lives (e.g. getting pleasure 
from a better understanding of science) and it is valuable for society because it 
improves its citizens lives in an important respect (e.g. through new technologies).  A 
second view is that intelligence can also have intrinsic value for both individuals and 
society (i.e. it is good in itself for an individual to be intelligent or society to have 
intelligent citizens).  As I will show, my arguments allow for either account of the 
extrinsic/intrinsic value distinction. 
 
The third distinction we can make is between positional and non-positional value.  
Intelligence has individual non-positional value (either intrinsic or extrinsic) when 
higher intelligence would be valuable to an individual even if others were similarly or 
more intelligent (e.g. being able to learn new languages quickly may be valuable even 
if others can do the same). 
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Intelligence has individual positional value when higher intelligence is valuable to an 
individual only because others are less intelligent.  It is important to understand the 
difference between intrinsic and extrinsic individual positional value in this sense.  
Intelligence has extrinsic positional value when higher intelligence helps to secure 
other benefits, for example, a person’s higher intelligence helps them secure a job 
over a less intelligent applicant.  Intelligence has intrinsic positional value when high 
intelligence is valuable to an individual not because of any benefits their intelligence 
helps them acquire, but because thinking more brilliant thoughts than anyone else is 
good in itself.  However, while intelligence plausibly has some intrinsic positional 
value, most of its positional value is extrinsic – it is valuable for an individual because 
it helps them gain other advantages. 
 
Intelligence has social non-positional value (intrinsic or extrinsic) when having 
intelligent individuals within a society creates benefits for others (e.g. society’s 
intelligent individuals develop a cure for a common disease).  I will not consider the 
category of social positional value.  The main reason for this is that any issues 
concerning one society’s positional advantage or disadvantage over another can be 
more clearly explained through the collective effect of individual positional value. 
 
In fact, all these value distinctions are important in how they relate to a fourth 
distinction – the absolute/positional distinction (which I briefly discussed in chapter 
2).70  Intelligence has absolute value when it is valuable regardless of whether others 
are also intelligent, i.e. absolute value is all the non-positional value of intelligence.  
This is distinguished from the positional value of intelligence, which is simply the 
individual extrinsic positional value. 
 
The absolute value of intelligence is determined by whether greater intelligence would 
be beneficial for either the individual or society even if everyone else had their 
intelligence enhanced.  Some things that could be pointed out as being absolutely 
valuable to the individual are: being able to learn different languages more easily, 
having a greater appreciation of art and music, having the ability to pick up 
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complicated ideas faster and acquiring a better understanding of scientific concepts.  
There is also absolute social value as discussed by Bostrom and Ord: “diseases need 
cures, scientific questions need answers, poverty needs alleviation, and environmental 
problems need solutions”71 (assuming, of course, that increased intelligence can help 
in all these areas).  Absolute value can be either intrinsic or extrinsic. 
 
The positional value of intelligence is simply the individual extrinsic positional value.  
I argue that competitive harms may be caused to the poor through the unequal 
distribution of genetic cognitive enhancements because of this positional value, since 
it gives an individual competitive advantages over others who are less intelligent.  For 
example: better exam results than one’s peers, more chance of winning scholarships, 
being able to get into the best universities, faster promotion up the employment ladder 
and an increased potential to earn more money more quickly.  The intrinsic positional 
value of intelligence is less concerning from a competitive harms perspective, since it 
does not contribute to an individual gaining other advantageous goods, and is 
therefore not included in the category of “positional value” I am interested in.72 
 
The table on the following page shows the value distinctions we can make with 
regards to intelligence (if one takes the view that intelligence is only extrinsically 
valuable, the rows showing intrinsic value can be ignored). 
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Table 1 
 Positional Non-Positional 
 
 
Intrinsic 
 
Having higher intelligence 
than others is good in 
itself, not because it helps 
secure other advantages. 
 
Intrinsic positional value 
High intelligence is valuable 
because it allows you to 
think brilliant thoughts. 
 
 
Absolute Value 
 
 
 
 
Individual 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extrinsic 
Higher intelligence helps 
you secure a job over a less 
intelligent applicant. 
 
Positional Value 
High intelligence is valuable 
because it gives you a greater 
appreciation of art and 
music. 
Absolute Value 
 
 
Intrinsic 
 
 
 
 
Not considered 
Having intelligent 
individuals in society is good 
in itself. 
 
Absolute Value 
 
 
 
 
Social 
 
 
 
 
 
Extrinsic 
 
 
 
 
Not considered 
Having intelligent 
individuals is valuable for a 
society because they find 
cures for common diseases. 
Absolute Value 
 
 
It is important to note that when considering whether a society should permit genetic 
cognitive enhancement, the positional value that enhancements would confer on their 
possessors should not be taken as a point in favour of permitting enhancement.  This 
is because any positive positional value increased intelligence confers on an enhanced 
person is offset by the decrease in positional value of an unenhanced person.  The 
positional gains and losses would cancel each other out.  If intelligence only had 
positional value, then the use of cognitive enhancements would leave society with 
only costs (transition and research costs for example, as well as the other harms I have 
discussed).73  It is only the absolute value of enhanced intelligence that should be 
taken as a point in favour when deciding whether a society should permit genetic 
cognitive enhancement. 
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 As I have stated, I will not consider social positional value.  Since issues of global justice are also 
important, I will take the view that any increase or decrease in positional value of one society compared 
to another would be irrational in the same way that the positional advantages and disadvantages of 
individuals seeking enhancements would cancel each other out. 
 
 
 52 
However, the positional value of intelligence is highly significant in another way.  For 
an individual, the positional value of intelligence will be a huge point in favour of 
enhancement.  The enhanced individual will have the competitive advantages that 
greater intelligence confers.  It follows that the enhancement of some but not others 
may result in detrimental consequences – competitive harms – for the individuals who 
miss out. 
 
Positional Advantages Create Competitive Harms 
Since intelligence has significant positional value, the unequal distribution of 
cognitive enhancements would be likely to exacerbate social and economic 
inequalities.  Gregory Kavka, for example, argues that positionally valuable but 
expensive goods tend “to advantage those members of society, in disproportion to 
their numbers, who are already most advantaged.  It therefore exacerbates, rather than 
mitigates, existing patterns of social inequality.”74   
 
However, as stated above, the concern with the unequal distribution of enhancement 
technologies is not just that some people will have a good that others do not have, but 
rather that the wealthy’s use of such positionally valuable goods would give them 
great competitive advantages over the poor, leaving the poor worse off in absolute, 
not just relative, terms.  People who become cognitively enhanced would be more 
likely to secure better jobs, be accepted into the best universities, earn the most money 
and acquire goods and services that the poor may otherwise have been able to obtain.  
For example, scholarships for high achievers that the poor may have had a chance of 
winning when up against wealthy but unenhanced competitors may become 
impossible to win when competing with students who are cognitively enhanced.  
Where effort may once have been able to compensate for some of the poor’s 
disadvantages in a society without genetic enhancement, environmental inputs may no 
longer be able to compete with the substantial genetic advantages of the wealthy and 
enhanced. 
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 Gregory S. Kavka, "Upside Risks: Social Consequences of Beneficial Biotechnology," in Are Genes 
Us? The Social Consequences of the New Genetics, ed. Carl F. Cranor (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers 
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Perhaps mild cognitive enhancements may not have significant competitively harmful 
effects on the poor.  However, if the kind of enhancements advocated by Bostrom and 
Ord become available, then their unequal distribution may result in the unenhanced 
poor having little chance of successfully competing for worthwhile goods and 
services.  This may leave the unenhanced worse off not only in relative terms but in 
absolute terms as well, thereby further violating the no harm principle. 
 
We can now see why we should be concerned about the unequal distribution of 
genetic enhancement technologies, but not necessarily of other unequally distributed 
goods (i.e. why enhancements and expensive cars are morally different).  Expensive 
cars and luxury yachts are not primary goods and do not seem to cause discrimination 
or have negative effects on reciprocity.  Furthermore, cars do not in themselves have 
positional value – instead, they are indicators of positional advantages (like wealth). 
 
BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND HARMS 
I have so far documented three types of harms to the poor that are likely to result from 
permitting wealth-based access to genetic enhancements – loss of reciprocal 
relationships, discrimination and competitive harm.  According to the no harm 
principle, permitting cognitive enhancement is therefore prima facie unjust. 
 
However, in order to determine whether permitting enhancement would be overall 
negative for the poor, we must also consider enhancement’s potential social benefits.  
Since intelligence has absolute social value, perhaps the poor would be indirectly 
benefited from having other members of their society cognitively enhanced, even if 
they are not enhanced themselves.75  If the absolute social benefits of higher 
intelligence are great enough to offset the harms to the poor, wealth-based access to 
genetic cognitive enhancement would in fact be morally permissible according to the 
no harm principle. 
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 We cannot, of course, consider the individual value of intelligence to offset any of the harms to the 
poor, since the no harm principle is concerned with evaluating the consequences for those who are not 
enhanced. 
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In what follows, I will outline a number of possible scenarios for the introduction of 
genetic enhancement.  While the postulated outcomes are, to a degree, speculative 
(since no one can predict the future with 100 percent accuracy), I will establish that 
the outcomes that the no harm principle would consider just are actually very 
unlikely. 
 
Potential Scenarios 
There are a number of potential social benefits to the poor to be considered.  The first 
is the possibility that the higher intelligence of the enhanced will enable them to find 
solutions to the serious medical, environmental, economic and social problems most 
affecting the poor.  These benefits may offset the immediate harms to the unenhanced 
so that they will be no worse off in absolute terms from a policy that permits wealth-
based access to cognitive enhancement. 
 
However, while it is certainly true that higher intelligence has had absolute social 
benefits (helping to facilitate scientific discoveries, foster new medical technologies 
and improve average well-being, for example), the inability to find solutions to the 
major problems the poor currently face (poverty, corruption, famine, global warming) 
is arguably largely due to a lack of political will rather than a lack of intelligence.  
 
Nevertheless, perhaps proponents of enhancement could argue that higher intelligence 
may help to develop solutions to these problems that do not require much effort or 
political will on behalf of developed nations to be effective.  In other words, even if a 
lack of political will is the reason that the current problems facing the poor have not 
been solved, higher cognitive capacities may be the solution.  
 
A major problem with this response is that the purported benefits are so uncertain.  
This is especially concerning given that only very significant absolute benefits would 
adequately compensate the poor, since the likely harms are so serious.  The 
uncertainty about how higher intelligence would help solve such problems without the 
need for political will surely weighs heavily on the side of caution.  Looking at the 
problem from the perspective of the poor, it seems reasonable for the burden of proof 
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to rest on proponents of enhancement in this case.  That is, they must be able to give 
some idea as to exactly how higher intelligence might facilitate finding solutions to 
problems which do not require political will. 
 
Furthermore, the moral and political marginalisation of the unenhanced due to the 
wealthy’s cognitive enhancement may make the wealthy even more unconcerned 
about solving the sorts of problems most affecting the poor.  Consider the fact that 
only a small percentage of pharmaceutical development is aimed at drugs for diseases 
that are widespread in developing countries, since these diseases are not common in 
Western countries (and are therefore not worth pursuing from a profit perspective).76  
Currently, legislation in the United States and the European Union provides financial 
incentives for pharmaceutical companies to develop these so-called “orphan drugs” 
(defined as drugs for diseases suffered by fewer than 5 in 10,000 people in developed 
countries77).  While arguments can be made as to the efficacy of this legislation, it can 
also be pointed out that without moral and political recognition of the people who 
suffer from these diseases it is unlikely that attempts to develop the required 
treatments would have been made at all.  It is clear then that the developed World still 
regards itself as having some sort of political or moral obligation towards the 
developing World, even if this concern for the poor does not go far enough.  
However, once the enhanced no longer regard the unenhanced as worthy of equal 
moral or political recognition, suffering that has little to do with Western nations may 
be seen as unimportant.  We therefore should not have confidence that the likely 
harms to the poor from wealth-based access to genetic enhancement would be 
outweighed by the social benefits in this manner. 
 
Nonetheless, there is a second way in which the cognitive enhancement of the rich 
may indirectly benefit the poor and compensate for the harms, particularly the 
competitive harms.  Perhaps the enhanced intelligence of the wealthy would increase 
the total supply of primary goods and services enough to outweigh the reduction in 
percentage of the unenhanced’s share – the pie would get bigger in other words. 
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 European Commission: Public Health, "The Orphan Drugs Strategy," EUROPA (The European 
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The first problem with this scenario is that even if the total supply of goods and 
services were increased, significant differences created by the enhancement of the rich 
may put the poor at so much competitive disadvantage that they are unable to 
successfully compete for the extra resources. 
 
More importantly, even if the increase in supply of the total available primary goods 
were enough in theory to offset the competitive disadvantage suffered by the poor, if 
the poor suffer discrimination, loss of reciprocity, or both (which appears likely), they 
would effectively be prevented from acquiring the extra primary goods.  This seems 
quite obvious when we consider that the economic benefits gained from slavery, for 
example, did not go to benefit the slaves.  It is therefore not implausible to assume 
that the marginalisation of the unenhanced in this manner would cause any theoretical 
benefits to them to be prevented from being practically realised. 
 
A third way in which the less advantaged could benefit from wealth-based access to 
enhancement is if genetic enhancement technologies eventually decreased in price so 
significantly that the children or grandchildren of the current poor would have full 
access to them.  This may mean that the immediate disadvantages suffered by the 
current poor (especially the competitive disadvantages) would be outweighed in the 
long run when enhancements become more widely available. 
 
However, while this scenario initially appears plausible, it is also unlikely to pass the 
no harm principle.  This seems true for two reasons.  First, without the environments 
in which they can be made use of, genetic cognitive enhancements may benefit the 
poor relatively little.  Genes do not work in isolation – they interact with other genes 
and the environment.  The worst-off, even if eventually given the enhancements, 
would need to place those genes in an appropriate environment.  Without access to 
those environments (education and proper nutrition, for example) it is unlikely that 
being genetically enhanced for greater intelligence would be enough to counteract the 
positional benefits conferred by increased intelligence on the wealthy.  There are 
already undoubtedly millions of “naturally” intelligent individuals living in the 
developing World; however, if they are living without access to food, clean water, 
education and basic health care, their situation is not made much better by having a 
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genetic predisposition for high intelligence.  Their genetic “smarts” are therefore 
doing little to make them competitively more endowed. 
 
Secondly, while old technology decreases in price over time, new inventions are not 
static.  By the time the poor would be able to afford cognitive enhancement Version 
1.0, the wealthy would be likely to have the latest and best version, therefore 
maintaining the competitive disparity that the original enhancement of the wealthy 
produced.  In this case there would be no mitigation of the poor’s original positional 
disadvantages. 
 
By using this method of balancing the potential benefits with the potential harms we 
are able to see that the benefits to the poor due to the cognitive enhancement of the 
rich are unlikely to outweigh the substantial harms.  Permitting wealth-based access to 
genetic cognitive enhancements would create serious moral, social, political and 
economic harms to the unenhanced that would be unlikely to be compensated for by 
the potential absolute benefits of enhancement.  From this analysis it is clear that the 
argument from inequality, motivated by the no harm principle, judges wealth-based 
access to genetic cognitive enhancement prima facie unjust. 
 
COMPETING MORAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Having failed to show that use of enhancements by the wealthy would not harm the 
poor, proponents of enhancement may instead claim that there are other moral 
considerations that have not been taken into account that override the no harm 
principle in this case.  If this is so, then even though permitting cognitive 
enhancements is a prima facie wrong, prohibiting them may be an all-things-
considered wrong.  The most likely candidate for such a consideration is a personal 
liberty claim.  If prohibiting cognitive enhancement would violate some important 
liberty right, then it would be wrong to prevent the wealthy from enhancing their 
intelligence.  I will now discuss considerations of liberty and illustrate why they are 
not weighty enough to override the no harm principle in this case. 
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Personal Liberty Rights 
I should first note that proponents of enhancement cannot appeal to libertarianism to 
justify the use of enhancements.  This is because the aim of my paper was to present 
the no harm principle as intuitively plausible, and then argue against cognitive 
enhancement based on the fact that the no harm principle had already been accepted.  
As libertarianism is an objection to the no harm principle itself, it cannot be 
considered a competing moral consideration – it is an objection to the framework of 
the argument, and as such, is an issue to be considered outside of this thesis. 
 
However, it may be tempting for proponents of enhancement to frame the debate as 
one over self-regarding actions (actions that only affect the actor), since the issue of 
whether or not to permit enhancements affects what people can and cannot do to their 
own bodies.  There is a powerful moral argument that self-regarding actions should 
only be restricted in exceptional circumstances (and some have argued that they 
should never be restricted).  Perhaps this concept has been expressed most profoundly 
by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty: 
 
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that 
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence 
is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is 
sovereign.78 
 
If the action of genetically enhancing oneself could rightly be counted as self-
regarding, then this would make an extremely strong case for the right to use 
cognitive enhancing technologies.  However, when actions affect others they do not 
count as self-regarding.  The connection between methamphetamine and violent 
behaviour could be cited as evidence that taking “P”, for example, is not a strictly 
self-regarding action.  Similarly, actions that have an effect on the liberty or equality 
of others should legitimately come into the sphere of moral evaluation and potentially 
legal restriction.  Since the poor may be penalised through competitive disadvantage, 
discrimination and loss of reciprocity if wealth-based access to genetic enhancements 
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were permitted, there is no plausible way in which one could argue that enhancing 
oneself is simply self-regarding. 
 
Nonetheless, while undergoing genetic enhancement may not be a self-regarding 
action, the most plausible theories of liberty make a presumption in favour of personal 
freedom.  This means that the onus should be on those who propose the restrictions on 
liberty to provide sound justification for doing so.  However, the argument from 
inequality certainly makes a compelling justification for restrictions on liberty in the 
case of cognitive enhancements.  First, as we have seen in this chapter, a lack of 
restriction would be likely to cause serious harm to the worst-off members of society.  
Second, withholding enhancement technologies requires relatively little intrusion into 
individuals’ personal lives.  For example, making sure germline enhancements are not 
carried out may involve monitoring fertility clinics, but it does not involve State 
regulation of one’s everyday personal activities.  Therefore, it is implausible to argue 
that restriction of genetic enhancement technologies constitutes too considerable an 
intrusion into the sphere of personal freedom, when compared to the consequences of 
not doing so. 
 
Thomas Murray argues, making an analogy to performance-enhancing drugs, that: 
 
Liberty tends to be treated as a kind of rhetorical trump card… [However] one 
person’s liberty to use a drug that significantly enhances performance affects the 
other competitors.  Their liberty to compete fairly and equally without using drugs is 
severely constrained by the drug-using athlete’s actions.79   
 
While not identical to the case of cognitive enhancement (taking performance 
enhancing drugs is cheating; sports are winner-takes-all competitions whereas 
pursuits in life are not) the analogy holds well enough.  One person’s liberty to use 
enhancements affects other people’s liberty to be effective competitors for desirable 
social goods.  The use of enhancements by some is also likely to morally, socially and 
politically marginalise others.  And while a presumption should be made in favour of 
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personal freedom, the burden of justifying restrictions on liberty has certainly been 
met in the case of cognitive enhancement. 
 
Liberty rights therefore do not provide competing moral considerations strong enough 
to override the no harm principle in this case.  Accordingly, we can conclude that 
wealth-based access to cognitive enhancements is not only prima facie unjust, but all-
things-considered unjust as well. 
 
THE NEW REVERSAL TEST 
The original Reversal Test has been shown to be ineffective in diagnosing status quo 
bias in the argument from inequality.  The major reason for this is that when the 
Reversal Test asks us to consider the consequences of lowering or increasing 
intelligence, it implicitly assumes that the whole population’s intelligence will be 
increased or decreased.  However, when unequal access to enhancements is the 
practical reality, concerns arise over harms to those who miss out. 
 
Bostrom and Ord recognise and respond to this problem.  They consider the argument 
against enhancement where the resulting negative effects on social equality are 
claimed to outweigh the benefits provided by the enhancement.  One way to 
determine the overall expected utility of enhancement where non-universal access is 
unavoidable, they argue, is to compare the expected negative effects on social equality 
with the expected benefits provided by the enhancement, and then make an 
assessment about the overall utility of the likely consequences.  However, they object: 
 
But realistically, there is no possibility of making this comparison in a completely 
scientifically rigorous way.  Subjective intuitive judgement will inevitably enter into 
the assessment – both of what the likely consequences would be and of the goodness 
or badness of these consequences.  We must therefore confront the possibility that 
these intuitions, which we perforce rely on, are biased in some way, and in particular 
the possibility that they are affected by status quo bias.  This is where the Reversal 
Tests come in.  Potential consequences that involve distributive concerns can be 
handled by the tests in the same way as other consequences.80 
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Bostrom and Ord then devise a new Reversal Test, which they argue can diagnose 
status quo bias in different versions of the argument from inequality: 
 
In the case of cognitive enhancement, we can apply the simple Reversal Test and ask 
whether it would be a good thing if the treatment group (those who would be given 
the cognitive enhancement) instead had their cognitive capacity reduced.  Are we 
prepared to claim that the status quo would be improved if the wealthy, say, suffered 
slight brain damage?  If we are not prepared to make that claim, then the onus shifts 
to those who judge that the nonuniversal use of the cognitive enhancer would have 
on balance bad consequences: they need to explain why we should believe that the 
current cognitive ability of the potential enhancement users is at a local optimum 
such that both an increase and a decrease should be expected to make things worse 
on the whole.81 
 
So, a new challenge is set.  Arguments from inequality, such as the one I have put 
forward, must now pass the new Reversal Test. 
 
Responding to the New Reversal Test 
There are three major responses to make against the new Reversal Test.  First, I 
submit that although my argument does rely in part on subjective judgment in 
determining the consequences of enhancement, it also grants a lot to proponents of 
cognitive enhancement and so has a substantial burden of proof to overcome.  
 
While it is certainly difficult to come to an objective assessment about the goodness 
or badness of the consequences of permitting genetic enhancement, it might plausibly 
be argued that the original choice of the no harm principle is not as influenced by the 
status quo bias as Bostrom and Ord may contend.  To see why this is the case, let’s 
first consider that the Rawlsian difference principle is derived through the original 
position, with the veil of ignorance erasing knowledge of potentially biasing factors 
(social position, wealth, race, sex etc.).  A defender of the difference principle could 
then argue that these conditions actually decrease the influence of status quo bias in 
choosing the appropriate principle of distributive justice.  Since it is even more 
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difficult to oppose enhancement using the no harm principle (as one has to show that 
enhancements would harm the poor rather than simply fail to benefit them) there is a 
strong case to be made that the no harm principle grants a substantial amount to 
proponents of enhancement.  That is, in using the no harm principle to argue against 
genetic cognitive enhancements, the argument from inequality must meet a high 
burden of proof.  This is a point in favour of the moral efficacy of the no harm 
principle.   
 
Secondly, and more substantially, the no harm principle is able to take into account 
the competing moral considerations in the new Reversal Test (the right to bodily 
integrity), meaning that it does not in fact make the implausible judgment that the 
wealthy are required to reduce their natural cognitive capacities. 
 
The no harm principle requires us to prohibit the cognitive enhancement of the 
wealthy because a policy that permitted wealth-based access to enhancements would 
be likely to seriously harm the unenhanced poor.  However, this does not entail that 
the rich are required to decrease their normal cognitive capacities.  We cannot 
legitimately submit an individual to neurosurgery, for example, in order to reduce 
their intelligence, as this would be a gross violation of that individual’s bodily 
integrity.  Any society that practiced this sort of physical coercion would be rightly 
considered barbaric.  The no harm principle considers prima facie unjust policies that 
benefit the rich but risk harm to the poor.  However, even the no harm principle 
cannot legitimise violations of important human rights, like the right to be free from 
physical coercion.  The right to bodily integrity in this case overrides the no harm 
principle, meaning that it would be all-things-considered wrong to coercively submit 
the wealthy to brain damage.   
 
This illustrates that competing moral considerations legitimately affect our judgments 
in cases such as these.  We can uphold the no harm principle by prohibiting cognitive 
enhancement technologies without violating any legitimate rights of the wealthy.  
However, we cannot and should not force the wealthy to decrease their natural 
intelligence levels, as this would be a gross violation of their right to bodily integrity.  
This important point will be raised again in chapters 4 and 5. 
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Thirdly, principles of distributive justice, like the no harm principle, are meant to 
govern the background social institutions.  The natural distribution of genes is not 
something which is subject to social redistribution according to these principles.  
Cognitive enhancement technologies, on the other hand, are legitimate subjects of 
principles of distributive justice.  The no harm principle therefore judges wealth-based 
access to cognitive enhancement technologies unjust, but does not require the wealthy 
to decrease their natural cognitive capacities. 
 
The consequence is that although it is unavoidable that the argument from inequality 
relies in part on subjective judgment in assessing the consequences of enhancement, 
the new Reversal Test does not show that the argument from inequality is influenced 
by status quo bias, and therefore does not provide any good reason for the arguments 
presented in this chapter to be rejected. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter I have met Bostrom and Ord’s initial burden of proof challenge by 
illustrating that neither version of the Reversal Test shows the argument from 
inequality, based on the no harm principle, to be affected by status quo bias. 
 
In order to successfully make this case, I first presented an argument to show that 
cognitive enhancements would be unequally distributed between the best-off (the 
wealthy) and the worst-off (the poor).  I then introduced the no harm principle, which 
states that a policy that benefits those who are already well-off but that risks to harm 
those who are worst-off is prima facie unjust.  I argued that the no harm principle is a 
plausible way of governing the distribution of cognitive enhancement technologies 
and I claimed that according to the no harm principle it would be unjust to permit the 
genetic enhancement of intelligence, since it would be likely to result in serious harms 
to the poor.   
 
The first step in establishing this claim was to illustrate that the poor would be likely 
to be discriminated against if wealth-based access to enhancements were permitted.  I 
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showed that there is a significant risk that the enhanced would equivocate between the 
biological notion of better intelligence and the moral notion of better.  When unequal 
moral consideration has so often been justified by perceived but illusory differences, it 
will almost certainly be justified by genuine, deliberately created differences.  
Secondly, I illustrated that the poor may be harmed through loss of valuable 
reciprocal social and political relationships.  Enhancements of the kind advocated by 
Bostrom and Ord would create differences between the enhanced and the unenhanced 
far too great for reciprocity to be maintained.  Thirdly, I argued that competitive 
harms to the poor are likely to arise because of the significant positional value of 
intelligence.  The competitive advantages conferred on the wealthy may enable them 
to acquire the goods and services that the poor may otherwise have had access to, 
therefore making the poor worse off in absolute terms. 
 
I also noted that in order to come to a proper assessment about the goodness or 
badness of the overall consequences to the unenhanced, it is important to also 
consider enhancement’s potential social benefits.  However, by presenting a number 
of different possible scenarios, I showed that any potential benefits to the poor would 
be unlikely to outweigh the substantial harms.  We were therefore able to conclude 
that wealth-based access to cognitive enhancements is prima facie unjust. 
 
I then argued that there are no competing moral considerations, like personal liberty 
rights, strong enough to override the no harm principle in this case.  This showed that 
permitting genetic cognitive enhancements is not only prima facie unjust, but all-
things-considered unjust as well, meaning that wealth-based access to cognitive 
enhancement technologies should not be permitted. 
 
Finally, I examined Bostrom and Ord’s new Reversal Test and showed how it is also 
ineffective in diagnosing status quo bias in my version of the argument from 
inequality. 
 
Having met the initial burden of proof set by Bostrom and Ord’s Reversal Test by 
showing that the argument from inequality is not influenced by status quo bias, the 
goal of the next chapter is to defend this argument against the strongest potential 
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objections.  In chapter 5 I will consider and respond to two consistency arguments – 
the “argument from medical treatments” and the “argument from education”.  If my 
defence of the argument from inequality rebuts these potential objections effectively, 
we can consider the Reversal Test to have been successfully responded to, and we can 
conclude that it would be wrong to permit the genetic enhancement of intelligence. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Consistency Arguments 
 
 
 
 
ARGUMENT FROM MEDICAL TREATMENTS 
In the last few years there has been considerable media interest in New Zealand about 
Herceptin, a new drug that has been shown to be effective in treating the aggressive 
HER2 positive form of breast cancer.  The problem is that Herceptin is very 
expensive, and there has been debate about whether it should be funded by the New 
Zealand government drug agency, Pharmac.  To date, Pharmac has agreed to fund the 
drug for up to 9 weeks of treatment.82  However, many women have been advised to 
take the drug for a much longer period of time, meaning that some breast cancer 
sufferers have received medical bills of up to $100,000 for treatment.83  There have 
also been reports of women unable to afford Herceptin who have had to forgo the 
drug completely.84  A similar scenario occurs with other expensive and non-
universally available drugs, like HIV/AIDS antiretrovirals, anti-malarial treatment and 
vaccinations.  Many people in developing nations are unable to purchase these life-
saving medicines that most people in the West can afford. 
 
This may pose a problem for the argument from inequality.  If I have argued that the 
reason we should not permit genetic cognitive enhancements is that they will be 
unequally distributed between the rich and the poor, then by issue of consistency I 
should also hold that the rich be prohibited from purchasing expensive medical 
treatments unless everyone has access to them.  Since there are many such drugs, like 
Herceptin or HIV/AIDS medication, that are not universally available, it appears my 
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arguments entail that these life-saving drugs should be banned, even for those who 
can afford them.  Bostrom and Ord suggest that opponents of enhancement who base 
their arguments on the unfairness of the technology’s probable distribution are 
committed to the view that “the world would be better if nobody had access to 
expensive AIDS treatments, given that such treatments are not currently available to 
everybody.”85 
 
If this conclusion were the inevitable consequence of accepting my argument against 
enhancement then this would obviously be a serious problem.  However, the reasons I 
have given for opposing the genetic enhancement of intelligence do not entail that 
medical treatments should be banned for everyone if they are unable to be made 
available for all.  This is because I have not argued that we should prohibit cognitive 
enhancements for the rich simply because the poor will not be able to afford them.  
Rather, I have argued that wealth-based access to enhancements should be banned 
because the use of cognitive enhancements by the best-off members of society risks 
serious harm to the worst-off members of society.  However, the greater use of 
medical treatments by the rich poses far less risk of harm to the poor than the greater 
use of enhancements.   
 
First, the use of non-universal medical treatments by the wealthy is much less likely 
to impair reciprocal relationships.  Second, discrimination because of enhancement is 
peculiar to cognitive capacities, so health-related differences are unlikely to result in 
the same sort of marginalisation.  And third, the greater use of medical treatments by 
the wealthy is also less likely to competitively harm the poor, because treatments have 
less positional value than cognitive enhancements.   
 
Furthermore, even if the unequal distribution of medical treatments were potentially 
harmful to the poor, there are competing moral considerations in the case of medical 
treatments that are not present in the case of enhancements, making the use of non-
universal medical treatments morally permissible in a way that enhancements are not. 
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Reciprocity 
In chapter 3 I expressed the possibility that the non-universal use of radical cognitive 
enhancements may weaken ties between the enhanced and the unenhanced to such an 
extent that political and social reciprocation would be unlikely or impossible.  To 
illustrate what kind of variation in intelligence would make reciprocal relationships 
impossible I used the comparison of the cognitive difference between a chimpanzee 
and a human (or a human and an Australopithecus, to use Bostrom and Ord’s 
example). 
 
Medical treatments do not pose the same kind of threat to reciprocity.  To start with, 
only severe sorts of disabilities, particularly serious mental disabilities, would 
potentially threaten reciprocal relationships between individuals or groups.  While 
true reciprocity between a severely disabled person and a fully able person may be 
impossible, treating such serious disabilities actually helps to secure better reciprocal 
relationships between the able and the disabled.  The treatment of mental disabilities, 
for example, brings those who were previously disabled into the dominant cooperative 
framework.86  Furthermore, even if the better medical treatment of the rich raised the 
level required for effective reciprocity within a society, this would be likely to 
exclude only those with the most serious disabilities (e.g. the mentally disabled), for 
whom reciprocal relationships with others were already difficult or impossible to 
maintain. 
 
As for the difference between the best- and worst-off societies, we may have concern 
that the increasing health of one group would raise the requirements for “effective 
participation in important forms of social cooperation,”87 since disabilities are to a 
considerable extent determined by the social framework.  However, the health gap 
between developed and developing nations is unlikely to reach the limit beyond which 
cooperative relationships can no longer be maintained.  For one thing, the number of 
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people in developed countries with serious disabilities is low, meaning that while 
treatment of these individuals would make major differences to them, it is unlikely to 
make a significant difference to that society’s overall reciprocity index.  Average 
health differences between developed and developing countries also do not seem great 
enough to make inter-society cooperation impossible.  We cannot reasonably argue 
that the risk of severing reciprocal relationships is high unless we are prepared to 
make the implausible claim that reciprocity between a perfectly healthy person and a 
person in the same nation with, say, hepatitis, is also impossible (as this difference is 
greater than the average health difference of the best- and worst-off populations).  
This is not true for the forms of cognitive enhancements advocated by Bostrom and 
Ord, since the disparities they would create between those with access to 
enhancements and those without are so extreme. 
 
Discrimination 
Discrimination against the worst-off is likely to be a significant problem with genetic 
cognitive enhancement because the enhanced may come to wrongly equivocate 
between biological notions of “better” and moral or value notions of “better”.  
However, as I argued in some detail in chapter 3, the threat of discrimination is a 
particular concern for genetic cognitive enhancement, not for the improvement of 
health, as evidenced by the major justifications of racism and sexism.   
 
Historically there has not been the same tendency to equate “better” in terms of health 
or strength with the moral “better”.  For example, many indigenous people were 
thought to be exceedingly strong but this did not prevent racism and slavery;88 we 
know that many animals are stronger than humans but this has not fostered the 
development of even basic rights for most animals.  Since racism, sexism and even 
speciesism89 have all been largely based on perceived differences in the genetic basis 
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of differences in intellectual capacities, the risk of mistake in equivocating between a 
biological notion of better health and a moral or value notion of better does not seem 
high. 
 
Loss of Support 
However, perhaps there are other potential harms that are peculiar to the unequal 
distribution of medical treatments.  Buchanan et al. discuss a concern made by 
disability rights activists that as genetic treatments for disabilities decreases the 
number of those with disabilities, the remaining disabled will suffer a loss of support.  
This worry can also be applied to conventional medical treatments.  However, 
Buchanan et al. note that the evidence has not supported the empirical claim that the 
disabled do lose support through treatment of disabilities.  In fact, there has been at 
least one case in which “a reduction in the incidence of a genetic disease 
[Thalassemia]… resulted in more resources being used to support the decreasing 
numbers of those who had the disease.”90  It also seems to be the case that in Western 
societies at least, where the number of treatments is higher, there has been increasing 
support for the remaining disabled (for example, wheelchair ramps, disability services 
in the workplace and at universities, buses that “kneel” and campaigns to increase 
awareness about mental health).91 
 
Competitive Harm 
An unequal distribution of medical treatments is also not as competitively harmful to 
the poor as an unequal distribution of genetic cognitive enhancements.  In chapter 3 I 
analysed the difference between absolute and positional value.  The positional value 
of intelligence, for example, is the extrinsic value of a person’s intelligence only 
because others are less (or more) intelligent.  However, while intelligence has 
significant positional value, the value of health is mainly absolute.  Being free from 
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cancer allows a person to regain all the things that previously gave their life value, 
such as being able to spend time with family and friends, returning to work, playing 
sport or simply performing many of the everyday activities that are too difficult for 
those who are sick.  The motivation, at least, behind undergoing treatment for a 
medical condition is not usually to secure competitive advantages. 
 
Also, in many of the plausible ways one could define the “best-off”, those with 
serious illnesses will not be included (since they can hardly be classified as well-off).  
However, if we have defined the categories of “worst-off” and “best-off” in economic 
terms, it may well be the case that many of those who seek expensive non-universal 
medical technologies are already part of the “best-off” category.  If health is in any 
way positionally valuable, the use of expensive medical technologies by the best-off 
members of society may endow them with competitive advantages and ultimately 
increase their capacity to consume a greater proportion of resources in employment, 
education and other goods and services that the worst-off may otherwise have had 
access to.  The morally benign status of the motivations may therefore not translate 
into morally benign consequences.92   
 
While in many wealthy countries the increase in consumption of these sorts of 
resources may be offset by the resulting ease of pressure on the national health 
system, the situation for the global society (or for societies without a strong public 
health system) is quite different.  If the majority of citizens in developed nations are 
able to afford medical treatments while the majority of citizens in developing nations 
are not, then the healthy developed nations may end up consuming an even greater 
percentage of other resources, leaving developing nations worse off in absolute terms. 
 
It now seems I would be obliged, by virtue of consistency, to hold that unless 
universal access is achieved or until the global society becomes structured like many 
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domestic Western societies (i.e. with basic publicly funded health care and sickness 
benefits) then we should withhold advantageous medical treatments even from those 
who are able to afford them.  But surely this conclusion is absurd. 
 
In fact, the argument from inequality does not entail that medical treatments should be 
banned for everyone if they are unable to be made available for all.  A major reason 
for this is that medical treatments are unlikely to be as competitively harmful as 
enhancements.  For one thing, the proportion of people in Western developed 
countries with serious disabilities is low, meaning that extra competitive advantages 
due to treatment of these disabilities would be negligible.  Additionally, while 
eliminating mild illnesses (such as asthma) in the rest of the developed nations’ 
population would greatly benefit the sufferers in terms of their health, their 
consumption of other resources (like employment) may be relatively unaffected.  
Enhancements on the other hand are more likely to increase resource consumption 
among the rich – first, because of the potential of enhancements to make a dramatic 
change in cognitive capacities and second, because every person is a potential 
enhancement candidate. 
 
Furthermore, enhancements have no theoretical “end-point”, unlike medical 
treatments.93  Eventually, the use of initially expensive medical technologies by the 
rich may facilitate their later uptake by the poor, assuming the cost of such 
technologies declines as they become more widely used.  This may start to decrease 
the health gap between the rich and the poor, since the health of the rich may reach a 
point beyond which no further improvements are needed.  Genetic enhancements on 
the other hand may not have this effect, since there is theoretically no point at which 
we can say their use is no longer warranted. 
 
There is a more fundamental reason that the argument from inequality does not entail 
that we should ban all non-universally available medical treatments.  While policies 
that benefit the best-off are prima facie unjust if they risk serious harm to the worst-
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off, there may be circumstances in which permitting these policies is, all-things-
considered, morally justified or even obligatory.  If there is an obligation to treat 
people, or if patients have a right to seek treatment, then these considerations may 
override the no harm principle.  This means that while the non-universal use of 
medical treatments by the rich may be a prima facie wrong, it is not an all-things-
considered wrong.  I will examine these competing moral considerations now and 
suggest how they are much stronger than any similar considerations that might arise 
in the case of genetic cognitive enhancement. 
 
Competing Moral Considerations 
For the moment, let’s leave aside the question of whether the use of genetic 
enhancements is morally permissible.  Instead, I want to show that while we very 
plausibly have obligations to treat illness and disability, it is unlikely that any such 
obligation arises in connection with enhancement.  I am not arguing that a sort of 
treatment/enhancement distinction reflects a distinction between what is permissible 
and impermissible.  Instead, I am concerned with the obligations society might have 
towards its ill and disabled citizens, and rights that arise in connection with these 
obligations.  I make the claim that most treatments clearly create a moral obligation 
on society and generate a right on behalf of patients to seek treatment, while many 
enhancements, such as cognitive enhancement, do not generate these rights or 
obligations (although they may still be permissible).  Let’s consider a few examples to 
motivate this idea. 
 
It is intuitively plausible that society has certain obligations toward people who have 
Parkinson’s disease, HIV or cancer, or people who are disabled in some way, that it 
does not have to people wanting to become brilliant musicians or to people wanting to 
raise their IQ of 110 to an IQ of 200.  Buchanan et al. ask us to “consider… the 
interest a person has in not having disabilities.  Surely this is a morally legitimate 
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interest.”94  But what interest of equivalent weight could we appeal to in the case of 
cognitive enhancement?95 
 
There are a number of plausible ways to defend the claim that the duty we have to 
treat those with HIV or cancer or Parkinson’s disease does not arise in the case of 
many enhancements.  One method is to use Norman Daniels’ account of just health 
care, which is partly based on the moral obligation to ensure equality of opportunity.96  
Buchanan et al. also agree that “there is a fairly broad consensus that it is important to 
restore to the status of ‘normal competitors’ those whose opportunities are diminished 
by disease and disability.”97  The notion of equality of opportunity therefore generates 
obligations on society to treat the sick and disabled but does not invoke any moral 
obligation towards those who are already “normal competitors” (i.e. most of the 
candidates for cognitive enhancement). 
 
Similarly, on a biological functional model of disease the duty to ensure normal 
biological functioning motivates obligations toward treatment of, say, HIV but not of 
enhancing an already normal IQ. 
 
Another extremely plausible way of illustrating the difference between medical 
treatments like curing cancer, for example, and cognitive enhancements is that the 
relief of suffering itself is one of our major moral obligations.98  Buchanan et al. claim 
that: 
 
One of the most basic moral obligations human beings have [is] the obligation to 
prevent harm.  People have especially demanding obligations to prevent harm to 
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their offspring, but through the agency of their political institutions, they also have 
obligations to prevent harm to others.99 
 
The obligations to prevent harm and relieve suffering also explain why we count the 
treatment and prevention of disease as a moral duty, but not cognitive enhancement. 
 
On each of these accounts, the moral obligations that arise for the treatment of illness 
or disease do not arise for the enhancement of normal cognitive capacities (this does 
not yet say that enhancements are morally impermissible). 
 
This is not to claim that there is a perfect distinction between what would and what 
would not count as an obligation under each respective account.  For example, it may 
be unclear whether or not some marginal cases do generate societal duties under the 
obligation to equalise opportunity.  However, this issue is largely irrelevant for the 
purposes of my claim here.  What I am arguing is that most medical treatments are 
clearly justified by these reasons, while many enhancements, such as cognitive 
enhancement, are not.  The difficult distinctions in some of the cases do not make any 
less clear the radical difference between enhancing normal cognitive capacities and 
using radiotherapy to treat cancer under each of these accounts. 
 
In fact, many proponents of enhancement accept that enhancements may not generate 
the same obligations as most medical treatments – they simply defend enhancements 
as something we are permitted to pursue.100  John Robertson, for example, argues that 
the use of genetic technologies to enhance one’s child is morally permissible if the 
parents’ choices can be understood in terms of procreative liberty and the 
enhancements would not “impose harm or burdens on others that justify discouraging 
or barring them.”101 
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Julian Savulescu is one of the few philosophers who argue that we are obliged to 
select the best genes for our children.  On his account, cognitive enhancements might 
hold equivalent moral weight to the treatment of meningitis, for example.   
 
Savulescu introduces the “principle of procreative beneficence”, which states: 
 
Couples (or single reproducers) should select the best child, of the possible children 
they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the 
others, based on the relevant, available information.102 
 
However, while the principle of procreative beneficence initially seems attractive, 
when we consider it as applied to environmental interventions it becomes clear that 
Savulescu’s account is not particularly plausible.  The principle of procreative 
beneficence judges it morally impermissible for families to move from wealthier 
neighbourhoods to poorer ones (assuming for the sake of argument that children do 
better in richer suburbs) or for parents to take holidays instead of using the money to 
send their child to a private school.  Once we understand the implications of applying 
the principle of procreative beneficence to social interventions, we can see that we do 
not have moral obligations to do the best for our children at the expense of all else; 
instead it seems we have these other duties – to avoid and relieve suffering, to ensure 
equality of opportunity.  We have a duty to take our children to the doctor if they have 
meningitis or tonsillitis.  We do not have a duty to send them to the best schools 
money can buy.  While it may certainly be permissible to make our children the best 
they can be, it is implausible to consider it a requirement. 
 
So, while there are no obligations to permit enhancement, society does have moral 
obligations to treat illness and disability.  And given that society has these obligations, 
then surely patients have the corresponding right to seek treatment.  This means that if 
we are unable to publicly fund universal medical care, a patient’s right to seek 
treatment for their condition means that society is not justified in prohibiting access to 
non-universally available treatments.  While non-universal access is certainly 
unfortunate for those unable to afford expensive medical care, it is surely more unjust 
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to prevent the wealthy from purchasing medical treatments, considering they have a 
right to do so.  In short, this would be a violation of their individual rights. 
 
Buchanan et al. make a response to the loss of support objection (which I briefly 
discussed earlier) that can be applied equally well to this case.  They argue that “the 
most fundamental problem with the loss of support argument” (or any argument 
against the use of non-universally available medical treatments that considers any 
harm to the poor to be always unjust) “is that it only considers the interests of those 
who…have disabilities… It entirely neglects the legitimate interests that people have 
in not having disabilities.”103 
 
The argument from inequality has a benefit in this regard, in that it does consider the 
legitimate interests of both the poor and the wealthy.  The no harm principle does not 
state that a policy that benefits the well-off but risks harms to the worst-off is 
necessarily an all-things-considered wrong; rather that policy is a prima facie wrong.  
If there are competing moral considerations to take into account – in this case, the 
right of the sick to seek treatment for their condition – then, all-things-considered, we 
may be obliged to permit that policy (i.e. to permit the non-universal use of expensive 
medical treatments). 
 
Buchanan et al. convincingly argue that there is a difference between: 
 
being harmed and being wrongly harmed.  Even if the minority who remain uncured 
[the poor] are harmed by widespread use of the surgical intervention it would not 
follow they have been wrongly harmed, unless one is willing to make the implausible 
claim that those who elected to be cured had no right to make this choice.  But 
whether they have a right to make such a choice will depend primarily upon whether 
they had a legitimate interest in avoiding being disabled and whether that legitimate 
interest is of such moral weight that it warrants special protection implied in the 
notion of a right.  Having a right to do something means having a sphere of 
discretion to do what might otherwise be wrong, including what may contribute to 
the worsening of the condition of others.104 
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So, while it may be true that permitting non-universal access to medical treatments 
risks some harms to the poor, a prohibition against the use of these treatments would 
be a violation of the right a sick person has to seek treatment for their condition.  The 
interest someone might have in becoming cognitively enhanced is not of the same 
moral weight and does not generate an equivalent “right”.  This is clearly shown in 
the justifications for the obligation to treat the sick that I discussed above. 
 
None of the above justifications for the obligations that arise in connection with 
medical treatments arise in the case of cognitive enhancements.  However, this does 
not in itself make cognitive enhancements impermissible.  Wealth-based access to 
cognitive enhancements is all-things-considered morally impermissible for two 
reasons.  First, permitting wealth-based access to enhancements is prima facie unjust 
because it risks serious harm to the poor.  As we have seen, wealth-based access to 
expensive medical treatments is much less concerning in this regard.  Secondly, 
unlike in the case of medical treatments, there are no competing moral considerations 
in the case of cognitive enhancement that would give the wealthy a right to use 
enhancements.  That is, there are no moral obligations sufficiently strong to override 
the no harm principle, meaning that wealth-based-access to genetic cognitive 
enhancements is all-things-considered unjust.  If the use of enhancements by the rich 
were not likely to harm the poor, or if the wealthy had some right to use 
enhancements, then we would have to conclude that cognitive enhancements should 
be permitted.  However, this is not the case, so the unequal distribution of cognitive 
enhancements remains morally impermissible, while the unequal distribution of 
medical treatments does not. 
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ARGUMENT FROM EDUCATION 
I now consider a second consistency argument, which has been advanced by John 
Harris,105 Julian Savulescu106 and Lee Silver,107 among other proponents of 
enhancement.  The objection begins by (rightly) noting that opponents of genetic 
enhancement technologies must take a position consistent with their position on 
environmental methods of enhancing intelligence, such as education.  The objection 
goes on to claim that opponents of enhancement are not in fact consistent in this 
regard.  While I will call this objection the “argument from education”, I will treat it 
as applying to all forms of environmental cognitive enhancement.108  This argument 
can take two forms.  
 
The first formulation of the argument from education is a reductio ad absurdum 
argument.  This type of argument attempts to show the implausibility of a proposition 
by demonstrating that its acceptance would lead to an absurd and obviously false 
conclusion.  Proponents of cognitive enhancement begin by accepting the proposition 
that wealth-based access to genetic enhancement is unjust.  They then maintain that 
since education, like genetic cognitive enhancement, is a primary good that is also 
unequally distributed between the rich and the poor, the argument from inequality 
must also hold that education is unjust and consequently should not be permitted.  
Since this conclusion is obviously absurd, proponents of enhancement argue that the 
conclusion that it is unjust to permit wealth-based access to cognitive enhancements 
must be false. 
 
In “The Reversal Test” Bostrom and Ord apply a reductio ad absurdum argument.  
They ask: 
 
Whether it would have been better in the past if nobody had been taught to read 
given that only elites had access to education.  And, considering that literacy is still 
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far from universal, especially in the poorest countries, would it be better if nobody in 
those countries (or in developed countries?) were given this kind of cognitive 
enhancement unless and until everybody gets it?109 
 
The second formulation of the argument from education begins with the premise that 
we already accept the unequal distribution of education and other environmental 
methods of enhancing intelligence, so by virtue of consistency we must also accept 
wealth-based access to genetic cognitive enhancement. 
 
Harris employs the second formulation of the argument from education.  He asks 
opponents of enhancement to explain “why, if it is legitimate to try to educate our 
children to acquire the ability to do mathematics, it is not legitimate to genetically 
engineer into them a like ability.”110   
 
In assessing both of these formulations, there are three possible choices one could 
make.  One could: 
 
a) accept that no form of education (or genetic cognitive enhancement) be 
permitted until it can be made available to everyone; 
b) accept that the genetic enhancement of intelligence should be permitted 
(and so should education); or 
c) maintain that there are morally relevant differences between genetic 
enhancement and the forms of education and environmental 
enhancements that we currently employ. 
 
Choosing (a) is not an attractive option for opponents of cognitive enhancement.  If an 
argument against wealth-based access to intelligence-enhancing technologies is to 
have any force, it cannot also entail the highly implausible conclusion that all forms 
of education and environmental enhancements should be banned.  The opponent of 
cognitive enhancement also cannot choose (b), for obvious reasons.  Option (c), 
therefore, is the only feasible option.  In the rest of this chapter I will illustrate why 
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environmental cognitive enhancements are different from genetic cognitive 
enhancements in morally relevant respects. 
 
As in the argument from medical treatments, proponents of the argument from 
education cannot simply point to education’s unequal distribution in order to make a 
consistency objection to the argument from inequality.  Instead, they must either 
demonstrate that the distribution of education poses a serious risk of harm to the poor 
(and thereby show we are not justified in prohibiting genetic enhancements for this 
reason), or, they must establish that the educational advantages of the rich do not 
harm the poor, meaning that their genetic cognitive enhancements are also unlikely to 
do so. 
 
In response to the argument from education I aim to show that while environmental 
and genetic methods of enhancing intelligence are not different in theory, in practice 
the unequal distribution of environmental enhancements does not pose as serious a 
risk of harm to the poor as the unequal distribution of genetic enhancements.  In large 
part this is because current educational disparities do not create differences as 
substantial as those that may be created by unequal access to genetic enhancements 
(like the kinds of cognitive enhancements advocated by Bostrom and Ord).  This 
difference in degree is highly significant when evaluating the effects of cognitive 
enhancements (whether environmental or genetic) under real life conditions.  As I 
consider in turn each harm I discussed in the case of genetic enhancement – loss of 
reciprocity, discrimination and competitive harm – I will offer further reasons, 
specific to each case, to believe that environmental methods are less morally 
problematic than genetic methods of enhancing intelligence.  From this analysis I 
hope to show that although the argument from inequality judges wealth-based access 
to genetic enhancements to be unjust, it does not entail that we should ban educational 
institutions, like Oxford and Harvard, for example, that are not accessible to everyone. 
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Reciprocity 
The kinds of genetic enhancements advocated by Bostrom and Ord would increase 
enhancement users’ intelligence to the extent that political and social reciprocity 
between the enhanced and the unenhanced would be virtually impossible.  Just as 
human beings cannot have effective cooperative relationships with chimpanzees, 
radically enhanced humans would be unable to maintain effective reciprocity with 
unenhanced humans.  Current educational disparities, on the other hand, do not create 
the sorts of differences significant enough to sever political and social reciprocity 
between those with access to education and those without.  Even the Harvard-
educated are still able to be part of the same political community as those with little or 
no education.  Any potential reciprocal harms due to unequal access to education have 
so far been effectively prevented by our social and political institutions. 
 
If there were an environmental enhancement (such as a pill or a method of education) 
that had the effect of making reciprocal relationships between the best and least 
educated unlikely or impossible, then we would have good reason to consider it 
unjust.  In Wonderwoman and Superman, Harris poses this thought experiment: 
 
Suppose a school were to set out deliberately to improve the mental and physical 
capacities of its students, suppose its stated aims were to ensure that the pupils left 
the school not only more intelligent and more physically fit than when they arrived, 
but more intelligent and more physically fit than they would be at any other school.  
Suppose that a group of educationalists, outstanding ones of course, far more brilliant 
than any we know of to date, had actually worked out a method of achieving this?  
What should our reaction be? ... We ought to want this.  It is, after all, what 
education is supposed to be for.111 
 
Harris seems to think it obvious that to label such a school unjust is absurd.  However, 
if Harris’s school made its students smarter than those unable to attend by a degree 
analogous to the cognitive difference between Australopithecus and Homo sapiens, 
then we would have a prima facie reason to consider the school unjust.  Nonetheless, 
the cognitive differences produced by Harris’s school or by institutions like Harvard 
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do not seem to be this significant.  Harris’s example seems only to highlight the fact 
that individual decisions appear rationally and morally different from collective or 
societal decisions.  Only an irrational parent would not want their child to receive 
these positional benefits.  However, the question of whether society should want this 
is a different matter. 
 
It may be argued that since a loss of social and political reciprocity is only likely to be 
caused by substantial intellectual differences, the no harm principle is, in theory, 
committed to supporting wealth-based access to minor genetic cognitive 
enhancements.  However, while the argument from inequality may in principle judge 
the unequal distribution of mild enhancements just, we are in practice unlikely to be 
able to limit genetic enhancements to those that have effects mild enough for 
reciprocity to be maintained.  This seems true for a number of reasons. 
 
First, somewhat mild cognitive enhancements are not the kind of enhancements that 
people are likely to desire.  If individuals are able to achieve the same results through 
less expensive environmental enhancements, then the only point of genetic 
enhancement will be to create really significant differences, like those advocated by 
Bostrom and Ord. 
 
Secondly, even small initial genetic enhancements may ultimately have large 
cumulative effects.  While each individual enhancement may be comparatively mild, 
successive use of such enhancements may produce significant differences. 
 
Thirdly, environmental enhancements seem to have some practical limits on the 
differences they can create.  This may not be true for genetic enhancements.  For 
example, if one extra copy of the intelligence gene can mildly increase intelligence, 
perhaps 10 copies will have much greater effects.  Certainly, geneticists have not yet 
ruled out these major enhancements.  While we may be able to raise our intelligence 
through genetic engineering by the degree that human beings are smarter than our 
Australopithecus ancestors, creating such differences does not appear to be practically 
achievable through the environmental methods of enhancement we currently use. 
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Fourth, those who are likely to have the best access to genetic enhancements (the 
well-off) already have the best access to environmental enhancements.  While current 
educational disparities have not made political reciprocity between the best- and 
worst-off impossible, significantly greater differences are much more likely to have 
this effect.  If existing environmental enhancements are coupled with mild or 
moderate genetic enhancements, then this may greatly increase the reciprocity index 
within a society.  This means that even somewhat mild genetic enhancements may 
create differences too extensive for effective social cooperation to be maintained, if 
used by those who already have access to environmental enhancements.  Slightly 
greater differences than those currently created by educational disparities may not 
make cooperative social relationships impossible; moderate or major increases may.  
Bostrom and Ord must be prepared to show that the use of mild genetic enhancements 
by those who are already environmentally enhanced will not create the sorts of 
differences that make reciprocity impossible.   
 
Finally, even if we are able to limit enhancements to technologies which produce only 
mild effects (which seems unlikely), these enhancements are still much less 
significant than the kinds of enhancements Bostrom and Ord want permitted.  So, 
even if my arguments show why only major enhancements are unjust, the argument 
from inequality will still have made an effective response to the Reversal Test, since 
the Reversal Test is supposed to show that even substantial cognitive enhancements 
should be permitted. 
 
Discrimination 
The difference in degree is also relevant when considering potential harms through 
discrimination.  The relatively major differences created by genetic enhancement 
seem more likely to be used to justify discrimination than the comparatively minor 
differences created through environmental enhancement.  Consider, for example, the 
way non-human animals are currently treated, or the justifications made for the 
oppression of women – that they lack the capacity for rationality.  Although unequal 
access to education does create differences between those with the best access and 
those with the worst, they are not significant enough to claim that the uneducated have 
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no capacity for rational thought, for example.  The ability of our social institutions to 
prevent harms through discrimination despite the unequal distribution of 
environmental enhancements may be severely limited once major cognitive 
differences are created through genetic enhancement. 
 
In fact, some of the empirical evidence seems to show that social enhancements have 
created surprisingly small intellectual gaps between the best- and worst-off.  Consider, 
for example, the Flynn effect, named after James Flynn, the New Zealand political 
scientist who first documented the effect.  What Flynn noticed was that IQ test scores 
have been steadily increasing in all countries (developed and developing) for which 
data is available since around the 1950s (although in some countries this increase 
appears to have now stopped).112 
 
Since the Flynn effect has occurred so rapidly (increases of up to 21 IQ points over 30 
years have been documented)113 it cannot be mainly genetically caused.114  And, while 
the exact type of environmental cause of the Flynn effect is not certain,115 it does 
seem to indicate that the unequal distribution of environmental advantages has not 
created the intellectual differences between the best- and worst-off that might be 
expected.  In fact, there is some evidence to suggest that average rises in IQ are 
significantly due to the better IQ test scores of the least intelligent.116   
 
Some of the more popular explanations of the Flynn effect point to plausible 
explanations for these findings.  One explanation suggests that better nutrition of the 
poor has helped decrease the cognitive gaps between the best- and worst-off.  Another 
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explanation, the environmental complexity hypothesis, supports the idea that social 
enhancements may be more easily shareable than genetic enhancements.  The greater 
environmental complexity of 2008 compared to 1970 affects all who live in that 
environment, whereas genetic enhancements only raise the IQ of the individual who 
has been enhanced, and potentially his or her descendants. 
  
It may be objected, however, that the explanations for the Flynn effect I have 
considered are relatively contentious.  Also, it seems true that environmental 
enhancements do have the power to produce genuine differences between people 
(whether cognitive or educational), even if they are not as substantial as those created 
by genetic enhancement.  This means we should not completely discount the 
possibility that discrimination against the worst-off will be justified by 
environmentally created disparities.   
 
Nevertheless, even if education does create differences, we still have good reason to 
suppose that its unequal distribution is less likely to cause the well-off to discriminate 
against the less well-off.  One reason for this is that education involves exposure to 
new ideas, not just an increase in cognitive capacities.  And, it seems the more one is 
exposed to new ideas, the more likely one is to learn that a person’s moral worth does 
not depend on factors such as one’s biology or intellectual or educational capacities.  
There appears to be some evidence in support of the contention that biased attitudes 
are negatively correlated with education, with one study finding that the more 
educated are less likely to have negative attitudes towards homosexuality.117 
 
However, I did previously rebut the assertion that greater cognitive capacities would 
necessarily entail greater moral concern for the worst-off, suggesting that while 
possible, we would need to have strong evidence of the efficacy of greater intelligence 
in preventing discrimination in order to support wealth-based access to genetic 
cognitive enhancements.  So perhaps the suggestion that being exposed to new ideas 
through education makes people less likely to discriminate faces a similar problem.  
Nonetheless, while we may not be justified in claiming that the unequal distribution of 
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education has any advantages in this respect, there are other considerations that 
support the view that current educational disparities are not generally used to justify 
discrimination against the worst-off.  These considerations cannot be invoked to 
support a similar conclusion with genetic cognitive enhancement. 
 
First, education has informed us (through scientific research) that supposed biological 
differences in intelligence between the races and sexes, for example, are not as 
significant as racists and sexists have claimed.  While some studies have pointed to 
subtle potentially innate differences between groups in a few specific abilities (one 
study found “men outperformed women on a visuospatial task and women 
outperformed men on tests of verbal fluency”118), such differences are comparatively 
minor.  Education about the similarities and differences between groups has informed 
us that claims like “women are biologically incapable of rationality” are simply false.  
If genetic enhancements created a group with much better cognitive capacities than 
another, we may no longer be able to make this claim. 
 
The second and more important consideration concerns the argument I made in 
chapter 3 that discrimination becomes a particularly serious problem when intellectual 
differences are genetically caused.  Even though both genetic and social factors 
influence the development of one’s phenotype, it is the biological causes of difference 
that seem to make people most vulnerable to the mistaken equivocation between the 
intellectual sense of “better” and the moral sense of “better”.  And as suggested in 
chapter 3, we would need to have good evidence of the power of enhanced 
intelligence to help avoid this mistake in order to be reasonably sure that the 
unenhanced would not be discriminated against. 
 
Where differences in intelligence can be attributed solely or mainly to environmental 
factors, the notion of equality does not seem threatened; where genetic factors are 
thought to be significantly responsible for an average intellectual difference between 
groups, this tends to be seen as a threat to not only intellectual equality, but moral 
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equality as well.119  Only in the former case are prohibitions against racism and 
sexism, for example, thought to be rationally justifiable.  The fact that it is mainly due 
to genes and not the environment that enable humans rather than sheep to think 
rationally seems to justify different moral consideration of their respective interests.  
 
I have argued this position in some detail in chapter 3 and so will not repeat the 
arguments here.  However, I will challenge those who are not convinced that 
genetically created intellectual differences pose a more serious problem for 
discrimination than environmentally created differences to provide evidence where 
environmental differences have been so successfully used to justify unequal moral 
consideration. 
 
Competitive Harms 
In chapter 3 I argued that since intelligence has significant positional value, the 
unequal distribution of genetic cognitive enhancement may cause the poor 
competitive harm, ultimately leaving them worse off in absolute terms.  We might 
expect then, that the unequal distribution of education would have the same effect, 
since education is also a primary good with considerable positional value.  For 
example, education is positively correlated with both income120 and health.121 
 
However, at first glance there seem to be plausible reasons to suspect that the 
competitive harms to the worst-off caused by an unequal distribution of educational 
advantages are not as significant as the competitive harms that may be caused by 
genetic enhancement.  For one thing, educational advantages are not as substantial as 
the advantages that may be engineered by the radical genetic enhancements Bostrom 
and Ord propose.  Also, education arguably has greater absolute social value than 
intelligence, in part because of the way it exposes people to new ideas.  Milton 
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Friedman, for example, suggests that literacy and knowledge promote “a stable and 
democratic society.”122 
 
However, it may be objected that the same can be said for the genetic enhancement of 
literacy, for example.  Furthermore, although the competitive advantages of education 
may be relatively less than those created by genetic enhancement, in absolute terms 
they are not insubstantial.  Accordingly, we do not automatically have good reason to 
discount the potential competitive harms entirely. 
 
Nevertheless, once we consider the potential absolute social benefits, there are good 
reasons to believe that the translation from theoretical into practical benefits to the 
poor is much more likely to occur because of others’ education than because others 
have been genetically enhanced.  I will now show why this is the case. 
 
Balancing the Benefits and Harms 
First, we should remember that the harms to the poor due to genetic enhancement are 
likely to be greater than those created by an unequal distribution of environmental 
enhancements.  Wealth-based access to genetic cognitive enhancements is likely to 
seriously harm the poor through discrimination and loss of reciprocity.  As we have 
already seen, unequal access to environmental enhancements is much less problematic 
in both these respects.  Also, the greater differences produced by genetic enhancement 
mean that its competitive harms may be much more serious.  These are two points to 
bear in mind in this section, because it means that potential benefits of environmental 
enhancements have to compensate for much less.  
 
In chapter 3 I argued that the harms to the worst-off caused by wealth-based access to 
cognitive enhancement would be unlikely to be offset by the absolute social benefits 
of the well-off’s higher intelligence.  Since reciprocity may have become impossible, 
and since the enhanced are likely to regard the unenhanced as less than moral equals, 
they may also reject the idea that the unenhanced poor are deserving of social benefit, 
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and may be unwilling to provide the resources needed to solve the problems most 
affecting the poor.  On the other hand, we have seen that unequal access to 
environmental enhancements is significantly less likely to result in the poor’s 
marginalisation, which means that any theoretical social benefits to the poor through 
others’ education will be more likely to be practically realised. 
 
I also argued that any increase in the total supply of primary goods due to cognitive 
enhancement would be unlikely to compensate for the reduction in percentage of the 
unenhanced’s share, due to reasons similar to those discussed above.  We may be 
more optimistic about the unequal distribution of environmental enhancements in this 
respect, since the poor will be more effective in acquiring the extra primary goods if 
they are not morally and politically marginalised. 
 
I further suggested that the disbursing effect of genetic technologies (i.e. that 
enhancement technologies may decrease in price over time, enabling the descendants 
of the current poor to access them) would be unlikely to mitigate harms through 
competition, discrimination and loss of reciprocity.  One reason for this was that I was 
sceptical about the genes being able to be placed in an appropriate environment – 
genetic enhancements may be of little benefit if they cannot be made use of by 
education, for example.  Second, given that new technologies do not remain static, the 
wealthy’s ability to continually acquire the latest technologies (i.e. the latest and most 
powerful enhancement) may maintain the original disparity that the unequal access to 
enhancement technologies produced. 
 
Education arguably acts similarly to genetic technologies in an important respect – the 
uptake of education by the well-off facilitates the eventual education of the worst-off.  
Given that (in the absence of genetic enhancements) the average genotype of the rich 
and poor is roughly similar, the eventual education of the less well-off means both 
their environmental and genetic inputs are similar to the rich’s.  On the other hand, 
without the right environments, the eventual genetic enhancement of the poor may 
achieve comparatively little. 
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Furthermore, although new forms of education are not static (using computers and 
calculators to help learn, for example) they do not seem to change quite as rapidly as 
new technologies.  Whereas genetic enhancement causes the poor to be continually at 
a disadvantage because of the uptake of new technologies by the rich, it seems that the 
more widespread education is, the further it goes to mitigating the original disparity 
caused by its initial unequal distribution.  Institutions like Harvard change over time, 
but not in a comparably radical fashion to new technologies.  While the rich will still 
have advantages (private education, for example), the public education of the poor 
will greatly benefit them. 
 
This analysis has compared three potential harms to the poor – discrimination, loss of 
reciprocity and competitive harm.  I have found that even though environmental and 
genetic methods of enhancing intelligence are not morally different in theory, they are 
nonetheless morally different in practice because the unequal distribution of 
environmental enhancements poses a substantially lesser risk of harm to the poor than 
the unequal distribution of genetic enhancements.  There is one final point to make in 
this regard.  I will now suggest that in the case of many environmental enhancements, 
there are competing moral considerations that make their restriction more morally 
problematic than the restriction of genetic enhancements.   
 
Competing Moral Considerations 
In order to illustrate how two situations with similar effects may be judged morally 
differently on the no harm principle, it is helpful to contrast two different methods of 
genetically enhancing intelligence – the use of genetic technologies and choosing 
one’s mate. 
 
Let’s suppose that IQ is almost completely heritable.  Let’s also suppose that all high 
IQ individuals decide only to reproduce one-another, and that over time this group 
becomes cognitively enhanced, causing harm to the less intelligent.  Since my 
arguments have shown wealth-based access to genetic cognitive enhancement 
technologies to be unjust because of similar types of harms, this seems to indicate that 
I am committed to supporting a policy that would prevent people from choosing their 
 
 
 92 
own partners, and perhaps even force them to reproduce with people of a particular 
level of intelligence. 
 
However, this is not the case.  Although I have argued that we should not permit the 
unequal distribution of genetic enhancement technologies, this does not mean the 
State should seek to prevent similar harms caused by selective reproduction by 
prohibiting the more intelligent from freely choosing their mate, coercing them into 
having children with people of the State’s choosing, or instituting a policy of 
compulsory sterilisation.  This would be an incredible violation of an individual’s 
rights.  But as we have already seen in chapter 3 and in responding to the argument 
from medical treatments, no rights are violated by withholding genetic technologies. 
 
The example given above illustrates that competing moral considerations can make 
actions with similar consequences morally very different.  And, in the case of many 
environmental methods of enhancing intelligence, there seem to be competing moral 
considerations that are absent in the case of using genetic technologies to enhance 
intelligence.  This may justify treating the two cases differently. 
 
I want to now suggest that the use of many environmental enhancements can be 
defended by considerations of personal liberty.  Although I argued in the case of 
genetic enhancements that liberty is not a “trump card”, I also noted that the most 
plausible theories of liberty make a presumption in favour of personal freedom (i.e. 
the onus should be on those who favour the restrictions).  As previously discussed, 
genetic enhancement technologies can be prohibited with minimal interference in 
personal liberty.  However, it would be impossible to regulate many environmental 
influences without considerable State intrusion into its citizens’ lives.  This may mean 
that those who advocate restrictions on these environmental enhancements cannot 
meet the required burden of proof. 
 
Take two potential environmental cognitive enhancements – good nutrition and 
reading to one’s child.  Would we really think it justified to prohibit parents from 
reading to their children?  Parents read to their children not only to enhance their 
intellect, but to spend quality time together and improve the parent-child relationship.  
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Furthermore, the risk of harm to the poor through these kinds of environmental 
influences is low (as evidenced by the arguments in this chapter).  A prohibition on 
reading to one’s children would require the State to constantly monitor the private 
lives of its citizens – to not only ban or restrict the sale of books but also to make sure 
parents did not create their own stories to read.  In this case, it would be difficult to 
show that the risk of harm to the poor was great enough to justify such significant 
restrictions on liberty.   
 
The same is true for improved nutrition, which not only may cause IQ gains but is 
also important for health (the value of which has been discussed earlier in the 
chapter).  To harm one’s child by not providing good nutrition would be wrong.  
Furthermore, State regulation of individuals’ food intake would require constant 
interference in people’s lives.  Withholding a genetic technology on the other hand 
does not require these constant intrusions. 
 
I have clearly shown in this analysis the morally relevant differences between genetic 
and environmental methods of cognitive enhancement.  By illustrating in each case 
the practical differences between the two, we are able to see that although using 
education and genetic technologies to improve intelligence are not morally different in 
theory, they are nonetheless morally different when evaluated by the no harm 
principle under real life conditions. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has been concerned with presenting and responding to two consistency 
objections to the argument from inequality – the argument from medical treatments 
and the argument from education.   
 
In the first part of this chapter I showed why the argument from medical treatments is 
ineffective in showing that the argument from inequality requires all non-universally 
available medical treatments to be banned.  I illustrated that health differences 
between the rich and the poor are not likely to cause discrimination against the less 
healthy, nor are they likely to make people so different from one another that political 
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reciprocation and social cooperation are impossible.  Furthermore, I argued that the 
better health of some is less likely to severely harm the poor in competitive terms.   
 
More fundamentally, I established that the obligations of society to treat disease and 
disability, and the corresponding right of the sick to seek treatment, mean that it 
would be morally wrong to prohibit the non-universal use of medical treatments for 
those who can afford them.  These rights and obligations are justified by the 
obligation to protect equality of opportunity, to ensure normal biological functioning, 
and the duty to prevent harm and relieve suffering.  However, none of these 
obligations, rights or duties arise in the case of genetic cognitive enhancements, and 
so cannot be invoked to justify their non-universal use. 
 
In responding to the argument from education, I established that while environmental 
and genetic methods of enhancing intelligence are not in principle different, in 
practice, an unequal distribution of environmental enhancements is not likely to cause 
as significant harms to the poor as an unequal distribution of genetic enhancements. 
 
In the case of reciprocity, I argued that the gaps that can be engineered through 
environmental enhancements are not significant enough to pose a threat to reciprocity, 
unlike the potential differences created through genetic enhancements.  I also showed 
that restricting cognitive enhancement technologies to ones that had only a mild effect 
is unlikely to be practically achievable.  I then suggested that the somewhat lesser 
potential of environmental enhancements to engineer difference as compared to 
genetic enhancements means that the unequal distribution of education is also less 
likely to result in discrimination.  More importantly, I maintained that the 
equivocation between the different senses of “better” seems to be a particular problem 
for biological, rather than environmental, causes of intellectual difference.  I also 
suggested that competitive harms to the poor due to environmental disparities are 
likely to be less than those caused by genetic disparities.  Furthermore, we saw that 
the translation from theoretical into practical benefits seems more likely to occur due 
to environmental rather than genetic cognitive enhancements.  Finally, I suggested 
that there are competing moral considerations in the case of many environmental 
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enhancements – that their restriction may require unjustified intrusion in personal 
liberty – that are not present in the case of genetic enhancements. 
 
Together, these practical differences show that while the argument from inequality 
judges wealth-based access to genetic cognitive enhancements morally impermissible, 
it does not require us to prohibit the non-universally available environmental 
cognitive enhancements that are currently employed. 
 
This analysis has shown that we have good reason to reject both the argument from 
medical treatments and the argument from education.  Therefore, given that these 
consistency arguments are supposed to be the strongest potential objections to the 
argument from inequality, we can conclude that the arguments presented in chapter 3 
and defended here make a successful response to the Reversal Test. 
 
In chapter 5 I consider a new method for testing for status quo bias that Bostrom and 
Ord present as a further burden of proof challenge to arguments that successfully 
overcome the Reversal Test.  I argue that this new method also fails to show that the 
argument from inequality is influenced by status quo bias. 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Double Reversal Test 
 
 
 
 
THESIS OBJECTIVES 
The main goal of this thesis has been to meet the Reversal Test’s burden of proof 
challenge by illustrating that opposition to wealth-based access to cognitive 
enhancements, based on considerations of inequality and justice, is not influenced by 
the status quo bias.  Having met the initial burden of proof in chapter 3 and responded 
to the strongest potential objections to my argument in chapter 4, the burden of proof 
now lies with proponents of cognitive enhancement to provide good evidence for 
thinking that the injustices I have predicted are unlikely to come about (although I 
have strong doubts that this can be done).  Accordingly, my goal of successfully 
responding to the Reversal Test has been achieved. 
 
THE ORIGINAL DOUBLE REVERSAL TEST 
However, the Reversal Test is not the extent of Bostrom and Ord’s burden of proof 
challenge.  At the end of their paper they construct a further hurdle for opponents of 
enhancement – the Double Reversal Test.  If an argument against enhancement passes 
the Reversal Test, the burden of proof shifts back onto proponents of cognitive 
enhancement, at which time Bostrom and Ord put forward the Double Reversal Test.  
The Double Reversal Test attempts to shift the onus back onto enhancement’s 
opponents: 
 
Disaster! A hazardous chemical has entered our water supply. Try as we might, there 
is no way to get the poison out of the system, and there is no alternative water 
source. The poison will cause mild brain damage and thus reduced cognitive 
functioning in the current population. Fortunately, however, scientists have just 
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developed a safe and affordable form of somatic gene therapy which, if used, will 
permanently increase our intellectual powers just enough to offset the toxicity-
induced brain damage. Surely we should take the enhancement to prevent a decrease 
in our cognitive functioning.123 
 
In the first situation we judge it best to use genetic cognitive enhancement to offset 
the brain-damage caused by the poisoned water supply.  Then: 
 
Many years later it is found that the chemical is about to vanish from the water, 
allowing us to recover gradually from the brain damage. If we do nothing, we will 
become more intelligent, since our permanent cognitive enhancement will no longer 
be offset by continued poisoning. Ought we try to find some means of reducing our 
cognitive capacity to offset this change? Should we, for instance, deliberately pour 
poison into our water supply to preserve the brain damage or perhaps even undergo 
simple neurosurgery to keep our intelligence at the level of the status quo? Surely, it 
would be absurd to do so. Yet if we don’t poison our water supply, the consequences 
will be equivalent to the consequences that would have resulted from performing 
cognitive enhancement in the case where the water supply hadn’t been contaminated 
in the first place. Since it is good if no poison is added to the water supply in the 
present scenario, it is also good, in the scenario where the water was never poisoned, 
to replace that status quo with a state in which we are cognitively enhanced.124 
 
In the second situation (once the poison has disappeared), the only plausible 
conclusion is that we should refrain from trying to offset the cognitive enhancement 
and should allow our intelligence to gradually increase when the population begins to 
recover.  Bostrom and Ord argue that since the consequence of non-interference is 
identical to the consequence of permitting cognitive enhancement under normal 
circumstances, then there is no good reason to suppose that permitting cognitive 
enhancements in the normal case would have negative overall consequences.  To 
claim that it is morally permissible for the population to become cognitively enhanced 
as a result of the poison wearing off in the Double Reversal Test but morally 
impermissible to allow the genetic enhancement of intelligence under normal 
circumstances is evidence of status quo bias, they argue.  Bostrom and Ord note: 
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The Double Reversal Test works by combining two possible conceptions of the 
status quo.  On the one hand, the status quo can be thought of as defined by the 
current (average) value of the parameter in question.  To preserve this status quo, we 
intervene to offset the decrease in cognitive ability that would result from exposure 
to the hazardous chemical.  On the other hand, the status quo can also be thought of 
as the default state of affairs that results if we do not intervene.  To preserve this 
status quo, we abstain from reversing the original cognitive enhancement when the 
damaging effects of the poisoning are about to wear off.  By contrasting these two 
perceptions of the status quo, we can pin down the influence that status quo bias 
exerts on our intuitions about the expected benefit of modifying the parameter in our 
actual situation.125 
 
Bostrom and Ord claim that the Double Reversal Test is effective in rebutting a range 
of arguments against cognitive enhancement, such as the arguments from risk, 
transition costs, evolutionary adaptation and person-affecting ethics, as these concerns 
are already taken into account in forming our judgments about permitting intelligence 
increases once the poison has disappeared.  That is, when considering whether it 
would be good for the already enhanced population to let their intellectual capacities 
increase once the brain damage begins to reverse, our answer already takes into 
account the potential negatives of the consequences of this decision.  Maintaining that 
we should not intervene to offset the intelligence-increasing effect of the enhancement 
therefore supposedly shows that opposition to enhancements in the normal case is 
influenced by status quo bias. 
 
However, the Double Reversal Test turns out to be an ineffective tool in diagnosing 
status quo bias in arguments such as mine that take the unequal distribution of 
enhancements to be a major moral concern.  The Double Reversal Test assumes a 
situation in which everyone in society is genetically enhanced, therefore automatically 
negating any concerns about injustices occurring through the unequal distribution of 
enhancements.  In the normal case, there is no such guarantee of universal access to 
enhancements, which is what gave rise to the argument from inequality in the first 
place.  Since an unequal distribution of enhancements is most likely, the Double 
Reversal Test as a tool in applied ethics should take this practical reality into account.  
                                                 
125
 Ibid., p.673. 
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THE NEW DOUBLE REVERSAL TEST 
In fact, Bostrom and Ord acknowledge that, for the reason I have outlined, the original 
Double Reversal Test cannot properly diagnose status quo bias in arguments from 
inequality.  So, they modify the test slightly.  The new Double Reversal Test is meant 
to once again place the burden of proof with those who oppose cognitive enhancement 
due to its unequal distribution.  The new Double Reversal Test evaluates cases where 
enhancement technologies would be unevenly distributed between the rich and the 
poor: 
 
If the release of a hazardous chemical threatened to reduce cognitive ability among 
the potential enhancement users [the wealthy], would it be a good thing if they could 
use the permanent enhancement to stave off the impending decline?  And if so, 
would it also be a good thing if, when the effects of the poison eventually started to 
wear off, the enhancement users refrained from taking steps to maintain their 
intellectual status quo (e.g. by injecting themselves with a neurotoxin)?  If the 
answer to both these questions is yes, then there is a strong prima facie case for 
thinking that it would be good overall – despite the assumed negative effect on 
equality – if the enhancement option is developed.126 
 
Of course, Bostrom and Ord are assuming that people will answer ‘yes’ in both cases.  
The intuitive response is that the wealthy should use genetic cognitive enhancements 
to stave off a decline in cognitive capacities, and should not to try to offset the 
enhancement once the poison has worn off.  Bostrom and Ord note that the 
consequence of answering ‘yes’ in both situations in the new Double Reversal Test is 
that the wealthy become cognitively enhanced while the poor do not.  They maintain 
that there is therefore no good reason for opponents of cognitive enhancement to 
contend that there is injustice in the unequal distribution of enhancements in the 
normal case, since we have already judged exactly the same consequence to be 
morally permissible in the new Double Reversal Test.  There is therefore a strong 
prima facie case for supposing that arguments from inequality suffer from the same 
status quo bias as other arguments against enhancement do.  The conclusion we are 
meant to draw, therefore, is that genetic cognitive enhancements should be permitted.   
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 Ibid., pp.675-676. 
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However, as I will show below, this argument is unsound.  Indeed, I contend that the 
new Double Reversal Test is fundamentally flawed. 
 
Competing Moral Considerations 
Bostrom and Ord fail to illustrate a logical inference from the conclusion that we 
should permit genetic cognitive enhancement in the new Double Reversal Test to the 
conclusion that we should permit genetic cognitive enhancement under normal 
circumstances.  In the new Double Reversal Test we can identify two distinct 
situations.  The first situation is where the wealthy are threatened with intellectual 
regression if they do not undergo cognitive enhancement in response to being 
poisoned.  In the first situation the only plausible position is that the wealthy should 
undergo the cognitive enhancement (this can be justified intuitively as well as by the 
arguments presented in chapter 4 on the use of medical treatments).   
 
The more interesting second situation is where the intelligence-decreasing effects of 
the poison start to wear off.  The wealthy can either do nothing (and therefore become 
smarter) or intervene, with neurosurgery for example, to offset the effects of the 
permanent enhancement (and therefore maintain their “normal” intellectual 
capacities).  Again, it appears that the only plausible answer is that the wealthy should 
refrain from taking steps to offset the enhancement.  However, this answer does not 
lead to the conclusion that in the normal situation we should permit the wealthy to 
purchase cognitive enhancements. 
 
Bostrom and Ord argue that in the new Double Reversal Test there is a conflict 
between two different interpretations of the status quo, which supposedly shows that 
status quo bias affects the argument from inequality.  However, it seems to me that 
there is not so much an inconsistency between two perceptions of the status quo, but 
instead a conflict between the competing moral considerations that are present in the 
new Double Reversal Test’s second situation but absent in normal circumstances.   
 
On the one hand, we have the no harm principle, which states that policies that benefit 
the well-off are prima facie unjust if they are likely to harm the worst-off.  A 
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commitment to the no harm principle would seem to require the wealthy to offset the 
intelligence-increasing effects of the initial enhancement in the second situation.  On 
the other hand, however, forcing people to undergo neurosurgery or poison 
themselves would be a major violation of their right to bodily integrity.  And as I 
argued in chapter 3, even the no harm principle cannot justify violations of such a 
fundamental right.   
 
The right to bodily integrity is recognised in many moral theories and is a vital 
component of Western and international political and legal systems.  For example, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights guarantees “the right to life, liberty and 
security of person”;127 patients have the right to refuse treatment, even when that 
treatment would be beneficial for them; vaccinations are not compulsory, even though 
the unvaccinated are placing themselves and others in positions of greater risk.  It is 
only in exceptional circumstances, normally where others are put at immediate risk of 
serious injury, illness or death, are violations of the right to bodily integrity permitted 
(such as isolating people with life-threatening contagious diseases).128   
 
So, while the increasing intelligence of the wealthy in the Double Reversal Test may 
harm the poor, when the right to bodily integrity is taken into account it becomes 
evident that the cognitive enhancement of the rich is not an all-things-considered 
wrong, even if it is a prima facie wrong.  However, there are no such competing moral 
obligations when considering whether to permit enhancement under normal 
conditions.  We are therefore justified in holding that while cognitive enhancement of 
the wealthy is permissible in the new Double Reversal Test, it is morally 
impermissible in the normal situation.  It follows that the new Double Reversal Test 
does not show status quo bias in the argument from inequality. 
 
In order to further illustrate: we cannot simply consider the fact that the wealthy will 
become cognitively enhanced in isolation from other factors present – we must 
consider the issues in context.  The problem with the new Double Reversal Test is 
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 Article 3.  United Nations General Assembly, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” 10 
December 1948, http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html. 
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 Other exceptional circumstances include hospitalisation and treatment of the mentally ill who pose a 
serious physical danger to themselves or others, and incarcerating people as criminal punishment. 
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easily identifiable once we recognise this point.  While two separate actions might 
both have the consequence x, if we are concerned about means or about justice, it does 
not entail that the two actions are morally equivalent.  For example: let’s suppose that 
in situation A, outcome x will result if we do not interfere (i.e. if we no nothing).  
Let’s now suppose that in situation B, we can bring x about only by providing 
something, y, to directly cause x.  It is not inconsistent to argue that it is morally 
permissible for x to come about through non-interference in situation A but morally 
impermissible to directly cause x by providing y in situation B. 
 
Consider this scenario: Miranda and Ethan want to start a family and eventually they 
conceive a baby.  However, Ethan soon changes his mind and tries to persuade 
Miranda to have an abortion.  Already pregnant, Miranda has the right to have the 
baby – it is morally wrong to force Miranda to have an abortion as this would be a 
gross violation of her right to bodily integrity.129  Now consider a second scenario: 
Sally is deeply in love with Jude and desperately wants to start a family with him.  
However, Jude does not want children with her.  Sally has no right to be provided 
with Jude’s sperm in order to have his child, as this would violate Jude’s own 
rights.130    
 
Note that in the second scenario if Sally has the right to be provided with something y 
(sperm) the outcome would be the same as non-interference in scenario one – a baby 
is born against the father’s will.  However in scenario one there is a legitimate and 
overriding claim of justice on behalf of the woman (the right to bodily integrity) that 
is not present in the second scenario. The right of Miranda to not have an abortion 
                                                 
129
 This is not to say that there is no legitimate discussion to be had about whether Ethan is morally 
obliged to provide child support, for example. 
130
 This fictional scenario is actually very similar to a real life British case in which a woman sued for 
the right to use frozen IVF embryos against her ex-partner's wishes.  When Natalie Evans discovered 
she had ovarian cancer, she and her partner Howard Johnston underwent IVF treatment and had the 
embryos frozen, since the cancer treatment was predicted to leave Ms Evans infertile.  However, the 
couple split up before the embryos were implanted.  Mr Johnston withdrew his consent for his former 
partner to use the embryos, as he no longer wanted to have children with her.  Ms Evens then applied to 
the courts to have Mr Johnston's decision overturned and the case ultimately went to the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights.  The Guardian reported that "the ruling said the 
judges did not consider that Ms Evans' 'right to respect for the decision to become a parent in the 
genetic sense should be accorded greater weight' than her former partner's decision not to have a child 
with her." Reported by James Sturcke and Karen McVeigh, "Woman Loses Final Embryos Appeal," 
Guardian.co.uk, 10 April 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2007/apr/10/health.humanrights. 
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against her will does not entail that Sally has a corresponding right to be provided 
with something (sperm) that would have the same result – a baby is born against the 
father’s will. 
 
While not completely analogous, parallels can be drawn between this case and the 
case of genetic cognitive enhancement.  In the second baby case, the only relevant 
moral consideration is that of Jude’s right to not have his sperm taken against his will.  
Analogously, when considering whether to permit wealth-based access to 
enhancements under normal conditions, the only relevant moral consideration is the 
no harm principle,131 which prohibits wealth-based access to cognitive enhancement 
technologies because of harms to the poor.  However, in the first baby case, Miranda’s 
right to bodily integrity means she cannot be forced to have an abortion against her 
will.  Paralleling this, in the new Double Reversal Test the wealthy cannot be forced 
to undergo neurosurgery (despite the harm to the poor), as this would involve a 
violation of their right to bodily integrity.  This example illustrates that simply 
because the wealthy have a right to preserve their cognitive enhancement through 
non-interference in extraordinary circumstances (i.e. in the new Double Reversal 
Test) does not mean they have the right to be provided with access to cognitive 
enhancements under ordinary circumstances.   
 
The Double Reversal Test fails because it implies that when two outcomes are 
identical, the actions that produced those outcomes are the same in all morally 
relevant respects.  However, my analysis shows that this is false.  To see how the right 
to bodily integrity affects the conclusions we should draw from the new Double 
Reversal Test, consider my revised Double Reversal Test in which potential claims of 
bodily integrity have been eliminated: 
 
If the release of a hazardous chemical threatened to reduce cognitive ability among 
the wealthy, would it be a good thing if they were provided with daily cognitive 
enhancing injections to stave off the impending decline of their cognitive capacities?  
And if so, would it also be a good thing if, when the effects of the poison eventually 
start to wear off, the enhancement users were continued to be supplied with the daily 
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 Given that the personal liberty considerations that could be appealed to in this case are not strong 
enough to override the no harm principle (as argued in chapter 3). 
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injections so that their cognitive capacities would continue to increase?  If the answer 
to both these questions is yes, then there is a strong prima facie case for thinking that 
it would be good overall – despite the assumed negative effect on equality – if the 
enhancement option is developed.132 
 
In this revised Double Reversal Test, our intuitions are completely different.  While 
the answer to the first question is ‘yes’ (we should provide the wealthy with daily 
intelligence-enhancing injections to stave off cognitive decline), the answer to the 
second question is clearly ‘no’ (we should not continue to supply the wealthy with the 
injections once the poison has worn off).  If we think the no harm principle should be 
applied in the normal situation, there should be no opposition to maintaining that once 
the poison has disappeared from the water supply, those no longer at risk of brain-
damage do not have the right to continue to be supplied with the cognitive-enhancing 
injections.  When we remove the competing moral consideration of bodily integrity, 
our judgments about the unequal distribution of cognitive enhancements become the 
same for my revised Double Reversal Test as they are in the normal situation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the original Double Reversal Test nor the new Double Reversal Test shows 
my version of the argument from inequality to be influenced by status quo bias.  
Bostrom and Ord fail to realise that there are competing moral considerations in the 
Double Reversal Test cases that are not present in the normal situation.  The right to 
bodily integrity in the new Double Reversal Test overrides the no harm principle, 
meaning that while the cognitive enhancement of the rich is a prima facie wrong, it 
does not turn out to be an all-things-considered wrong.  However, there are no such 
competing moral obligations in normal circumstances, meaning that permitting 
wealth-based access to cognitive enhancement remains all-things-considered unjust.  
Therefore, Bostrom and Ord cannot use the conclusion that we should permit 
cognitive enhancement in the new Double Reversal Test to infer that we should also 
permit wealth-based access to cognitive enhancements in the normal situation.   
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTERS REVIEW 
In the very first paragraphs of this thesis I noted how future genetic enhancement 
technologies have the potential for both good and bad.  This means that it is important 
to morally evaluate the issues surrounding the use of genetic enhancements before the 
technologies are developed, in order to know whether we should prohibit or welcome 
their use.  I also noted that we should not assume that one argument will suffice for 
determining the moral status of using genetic enhancements generally; instead, it may 
turn out that some enhancements are morally permissible while others are not.  
Accordingly, my moral evaluation was to be concerned solely with arguing against 
the genetic enhancement of intelligence (specifically, responding to Bostrom and 
Ord’s Reversal Test). 
  
In chapter 2 I examined Bostrom and Ord’s contention that subjective judgments can 
often be influenced by psychological biases.  I presented their Reversal Test, which 
they use to diagnose status quo bias in arguments against cognitive enhancement.  The 
Reversal Test poses a burden of proof challenge to opponents of cognitive 
enhancement: if one is to argue that we should neither decrease nor increase our 
cognitive capacities, then one should supply good reasons for holding that the status 
quo (our current level of intelligence) cannot be improved.  If no sound justification 
can be offered, this indicates that the argument against enhancement suffers from 
status quo bias and is therefore not morally compelling. 
 
In chapter 3 I responded to the Reversal Test by arguing that while enhanced 
intelligence may be beneficial for the individual, the probable unequal distribution of 
enhancements is likely to cause serious injustices to those who miss out.  In order to 
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establish this claim, I first showed that despite Bostrom and Ord’s ideal assumption of 
affordability, wealth-based access to genetic enhancement technologies would result 
in enhancements being unequally distributed between the rich and the poor.  
Secondly, I introduced the no harm principle of justice, which I argued is an 
intuitively plausible way of governing the distribution of cognitive enhancement 
technologies.  Once considerations of risk under uncertainty were taken into account, 
the no harm principle stated: 
 
A policy that benefits the best-off members of society but carries a significant risk of 
harm to the worst-off members of society is prima facie unjust.   
 
I then showed that permitting wealth-based access to genetic cognitive enhancements 
would be likely to harm the unenhanced poor in three ways, and so violate the no 
harm principle.  First, the enhanced would be likely to discriminate against the 
unenhanced, by equating their biological intellectual superiority with moral 
superiority.  Second, the poor may be harmed through loss of valuable forms of 
reciprocal political and social relationships.  Third, wealth-based access to cognitive 
enhancements would be likely to competitively harm the poor, by leaving them 
unable to compete for resources they might otherwise have been able to acquire. 
 
By using a method of balancing the potential benefits of enhancement with the 
potential harms, we also saw that any absolute social benefits would be unlikely to 
compensate for the harms caused by discrimination, loss of reciprocity and 
competitive disadvantages.  The unequal distribution of enhancements would 
therefore be on balance bad for the poor, meaning that permitting wealth-based access 
to enhancements is prima facie unjust. 
 
I then addressed whether any competing moral considerations weigh heavily enough 
to override the no harm principle and so make wealth-based access to enhancements 
morally permissible, all-things-considered.  I suggested that the most likely candidate 
for a competing moral consideration is some sort of personal liberty right.  However, 
given the seriousness of the harms to the poor and the fact that prohibiting 
enhancements requires relatively little interference in personal freedom, I showed that 
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any liberty considerations are not strong enough to override the no harm principle in 
this case.  Accordingly, we could conclude that wealth-based access to genetic 
cognitive enhancements would be all-things-considered unjust. 
 
The final task of chapter 3 was to examine the new Reversal Test, which Bostrom and 
Ord revise in an attempt to diagnose status quo bias in arguments from inequality.  
The new Reversal Test works by noting that most of those who oppose increases in 
the wealthy’s intelligence would also oppose decreases in the wealthy’s intelligence.  
This shifts the onus onto those who oppose enhancement on grounds of its unequal 
distribution – they must justify why the wealthy’s current level of intelligence is at a 
local optimum. 
 
However, I demonstrated that the new Reversal Test is also ineffective in showing the 
argument from inequality to be influenced by status quo bias.  The reason we cannot 
submit the wealthy to brain damage in order to reduce their cognitive capacities is not 
that the wealthy’s level of intelligence is necessarily at a local optimum, but that 
brain-damaging someone or forcing neurosurgery on them would be a gross violation 
of an individual’s right to bodily integrity.  This means that although increasing the 
wealthy’s intelligence through cognitive enhancement is morally impermissible, so 
too is coercively decreasing their intelligence. 
 
By showing the argument from inequality to be free from status quo bias, the 
objective in chapter 3 of meeting the Reversal Test’s initial burden of proof challenge 
had been successfully achieved. 
 
The goal of chapter 4 was to examine and rebut the strongest potential objections to 
the argument from inequality.  I considered two consistency arguments – the 
argument from medical treatments and the argument from education.  Both arguments 
can be expressed: since education and medical treatments are primary goods that are 
unequally distributed between the rich and the poor, the argument from inequality 
entails we should prohibit education and non-universal medical treatments for 
everyone if they are unable to be made available for all.  Proponents of enhancement 
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claim that since this conclusion is obviously absurd, the argument from inequality 
must be unsound. 
 
In the case of medical treatments, I showed that their unequal distribution is unlikely 
to be harmful to the poor through discrimination, loss of reciprocity or loss of support.  
I also argued that competitive harms are less likely to occur because of the unequal 
distribution of medical treatments than they are through the unequal distribution of 
cognitive enhancements.  However, the most important part of my response was to 
illustrate that the non-universal use of medical treatments is justified by society’s 
obligation to treat illness and disease, and the corresponding right of patients to seek 
treatment for their conditions.  Neither these rights nor these obligations arise in 
connection with cognitive enhancement.  This explains why we should permit the 
private purchase of non-universally available medical treatments, but prohibit wealth-
based access to genetic cognitive enhancements. 
 
In rebutting the argument from education, I maintained that even though 
environmental and genetic methods of enhancing intelligence are not morally 
different in theory, we are nonetheless justified in coming to different conclusions 
about their respective moral permissibility.  This is because in practical terms, the 
differences created by an unequal distribution of environmental enhancements are 
much less likely to harm the poor than the differences created by an unequal 
distribution of genetic enhancements. 
 
First, I argued that while the intellectual differences produced by wealth-based access 
to genetic enhancements may be so extensive that reciprocity becomes no longer 
possible, the differences created by educational disparities are highly unlikely to be 
significant enough to sever cooperative relationships between the best- and worst-off.  
I also showed that while the argument from inequality may in theory judge mild 
genetic enhancements morally permissible, in practice we are unlikely to be able to 
restrict enhancements to ones that have only a mild effect. 
 
Second, I argued that the smaller differences created by environmental enhancements 
(evidenced by the Flynn effect) are less likely to cause discrimination.  More 
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importantly, I returned to the arguments made in chapter 3 that the tendency to 
equivocate between the different senses of “better” is a particular problem when 
cognitive differences are genetically, rather than environmentally, caused. 
 
Third, by again considering the difference in degree, I noted that the competitive 
harms to the poor due to others’ education may be less extensive than the competitive 
harms due to others’ cognitive enhancement.  Furthermore, I submitted that the 
absolute social benefits of education are more likely to compensate for competitive 
harms than the absolute social benefits of enhancement.  This seems true for a number 
or reasons: one, the benefits of education have to compensate for less harm; two, in 
the case of education the poor are not morally and politically marginalised; and three, 
the eventual education of the poor will greatly benefit them, while their eventual 
enhancement may mean little if they cannot place their genes in an appropriate 
environment, or if the wealthy continue to acquire the latest and best enhancements. 
 
Finally, I maintained that prohibiting or strictly regulating many environmental 
enhancements would require considerable restrictions on personal liberty; far more so 
than if genetic enhancement technologies were prohibited.  I suggested that these 
competing moral considerations make the restriction of many environmental 
enhancements more morally problematic than the restriction of genetic enhancements. 
 
By presenting my case against cognitive enhancement in chapter 3 and rebutting the 
strongest potential objections to my argument in chapter 4, the argument from 
inequality was ultimately shown to meet the Reversal Test’s burden of proof 
challenge.   
 
In chapter 5 I tackled Bostrom and Ord’s second burden of proof argument.  The 
Double Reversal Test attempts to diagnose status quo bias in arguments against 
enhancement by showing that since the outcome we judge as morally acceptable in 
the Double Reversal Test is identical to the outcome of permitting enhancement under 
normal conditions, opposition to cognitive enhancement (including the argument from 
inequality, which is taken into account in the new Double Reversal Test) is influenced 
by status quo bias. 
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I rebutted the new Double Reversal Test by illustrating that it introduces competing 
moral considerations that are not present when considering whether to permit 
cognitive enhancements under normal conditions, meaning that it is ineffective in 
showing the argument from inequality to be influenced by status quo bias.  The 
competing moral consideration of bodily integrity means that requiring the wealthy to 
undergo brain surgery in order to maintain their intellectual status quo would be a 
gross violation of their rights.  However, no such rights are violated by withholding 
genetic technologies in the normal situation.  Therefore, we are justified in concluding 
that while we must permit the rich’s intelligence to increase once the poison has worn 
off in the new Double Reversal Test, we should not permit the wealthy to purchase 
cognitive enhancements under normal conditions. 
 
The argument from inequality based on the no harm principle has therefore been 
shown to pass both the simple Reversal and Double Reversal Tests.  Consequently, 
the burden of proof challenges that Bostrom and Ord set have been successfully met.   
 
OTHER PSYCHOLOGICAL BIASES? 
It is interesting to note that, contrary to the argument I have submitted, many 
proponents of enhancement (including Bostrom and Ord) espouse the wonderful 
benefits of cognitive enhancement.  In the paper “Why I Want to be a Posthuman 
When I Grow Up” Bostrom writes: 
  
You have just celebrated your 170th birthday and you feel stronger than ever.  Each 
day is a joy.  You have invented entirely new art forms… You are communicating 
with your contemporaries using a language…that has a vocabulary and expressive 
power that enables you to share and discuss thoughts and feelings that unaugmented 
humans could not even think or experience.  You play a certain kind of new game 
which combines…artistic expression, dance, humour, interpersonal dynamics, and 
various novel faculties and the emergent phenomena they make possible, and which 
is more fun than anything you ever did during the first hundred years of your 
existence.  When you are playing this game with your friends, you feel how every 
fiber of your body and mind is stretched to its limit in the most creative and 
imaginative way, and you are creating new realms of abstract and concrete beauty 
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that humans could never (concretely) dream of.  You are always ready to feel with 
those who suffer misfortunes, and to work hard to help them get back on their feet.  
You are also involved in a large voluntary organization that works to reduce 
suffering of animals in their natural environment… Things are getting better, but 
already each day is fantastic.133 
 
If this scenario accurately represented the likely reality of permitting genetic cognitive 
enhancements, then it would probably be more difficult to justify their prohibition.  
However, the problem with Bostrom’s predictions is that they are simply too fantastic 
and uncertain.  The far-fetched nature of the scenario Bostrom presents suggests that 
judgments made by proponents of enhancement may also be negatively influenced by 
psychological biases. 
 
Ian Newby-Clark and Michael Ross examine some potentially relevant biases.  In a 
series of studies they found that people were generally “much more hopeful about 
their futures than their pasts seem to warrant” and “the process of thinking of a future 
event and judging it as likely took longer for likely negative events than likely 
positive events.”134  This indicates that judgments about the future may be more 
positive than the evidence would warrant.  Additionally, while loss aversion may 
caution opponents of enhancement to also consider enhancement’s benefits, another 
cognitive bias – the durability bias – may also mean that transhumanists’ predictions 
about the goodness of the consequences of enhancement may be somewhat 
overestimated.135  Other studies have also confirmed psychological biases that make 
people “unrealistically optimistic about future life events.”136  Further research into 
the processes of human decision making may reveal that some of the arguments made 
by proponents of enhancement are also influenced by various psychological biases. 
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In any event, regardless of whether Bostrom and Ord’s predictions about the benefits 
of enhancement are influenced by cognitive biases, the Reversal Test and the Double 
Reversal Test remain legitimate and compelling challenges to opponents of 
enhancement.  That said, neither the simple Reversal Test nor the Double Reversal 
Tests are effective in showing that opposition to enhancement based on the no harm 
principle is influenced by the status quo bias.  As we have seen in this thesis, wealth-
based access to genetic cognitive enhancements can be successfully opposed by the 
argument from inequality. 
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